Semantic memory for metaphor: The conceptual base hypothesis

The idea that people can encode and use an extremely abstract and general form of a complex linguistic (proverb) input-a conceptual base-was examined in two experiments. In Experiment I, each proverb was accompanied by either a conceptually related (good, mediocre, or poor) or an unrelated interpretation. The related interpretations were more effective recall prompts than were the unrelated interpretations, but only for high-imagery proverbs. In Experiment II, subjects wrote interpretations of the proverbs and then received either the proverb subject-noun or a brief story as a prompt. As was the case for the interpretations in Experiment I, the stories did not share any major vocabulary or propositional structure with their proverb source. Nonetheless, the stories were as effective as the nouns. Also, quality of proverb interpretation and of recall performance were positively related, with the correlations involving low-imagery proverbs, and stories, tending to be higher. Both experiments provided support for the conceptual-base notion, and underlined the importance of interpretive context, but more definitive evidence is needed.     

Ear differences in the recall of monaurally presented sentences

Using a short-term memory paradigm, with an interpolated task, college students were required to recall monaurally presented sentences. Four types of sentences, representing a factorial combination of Surface Structure, either right-branching or self-embedded, and Semantic Constraint, either semantically normal or semantically anomalous, were used. Analysis of recall data indicated a right ear advantage (REA). This result clearly contradicts Kimura's (1967) “perceptual rivalry” hypothesis which assumes that auditory conflict as induced, for example, through dichotic stimulation, is necessary for producing a REA in verbal processing. It was concluded that short-term and attentional factors contributed to the presence of the REA. No interactions involving Ear and either Surface Structure and/or Semantic Constraint were obtained and, therefore, no conclusion could be drawn regarding the view (Kimura and Folb, 1968; Studdert-Kennedy and Shankweiler, 1970) that the lateralized speech encoding mechanisms operate solely at a phonemic or subphonemic level.     

The conceptual base view of categorization

An experiment was designed to show that some categories, called Type C categories, are mediated by an abstract, interpretively derived conceptual base. To this end, each of four groups of subjects ranked 10 sentences (instances) in terms of how well they illustrated the figurative meaning of a proverb (Proverb group), or how well they illustrated the meaning of an excellent interpretation of the proverb (Excellent Interpretation group), or a poor interpretation of the proverb (Poor Interpretation group), or an unspecified, unstated underlying meaning (Control group). The Excellent Interpretation groups' rankings correlated highly with standard ranks established by the Proverb group, but the Poor Interpretation group's and the Control group's ranking were uncorrelated with these two group's rankings. Apparently, the subjects in the Proverb group accomplished their rankings by using a conceptual base or microtheory similar in meaning to the interpretation used by the Excellent Interpretation group. Discussion centered on the question of whether the Classical, Probabilistic, or Exemplar Views of categorization (Smith & Medin, 1981) could account for the results. It was argued that they could not, basically because Type C categories are more dependent upon interpretive processes than the more perceptually based Type P categories to which these views have traditionally been applied.IBM.     

The role of imagery,analogy, and instantiation in proverb comprehension

The role of imagery, analogy, and instantiation in understanding proverbs was examined in the light of the Conceptual Base Theory (CBT). The CBT proposes that proverb comprehension involves four phases and that (a) after Problem Recognition, imagery is often used during the Literal Transformation Phase with the intention of constructing a figurative meaning but that imagery does not enter into this meaning; (b) figurative meaning is the solution to a four-part, a:b::c:d, analogy, which occurs during the Figurative Phase; (c) the Instantiation Phase can be entered only if a figurative meaning is constructed, but once instantiation occurs it serves to refine this meaning. A transfer paradigm was used to test these hypotheses. During acquisition, the subjects were presented proverbs and given rating tasks in connection with one of the following: pictures that illustrated the literal proverb information (picture groups), instructions to image the literal proverb information (imagery groups), or analogies involving literala andb terms drawn from the proverb andc andd terms that constituted an interpretation of the proverb (analogy group), concrete verbal instances that illustrated the proverbs' figurative meanings (instance group), or an analogy and an instance (analogy-instance group). During transfer, all subjects attempted to distinguish between novel sentences that were either positive or negative instances of the figurative meaning of the acquisition proverbs. The picture and imagery groups, which were assumed to have used imagery without the intention of constructing a figurative meaning, performed at chance. The analogy group performed above chance and on a par with the instance group subjects, who theoretically had constructed and solved an implicit analogy. The analogy-instance group showed superior performance. Discussion centered on the pattern of the results in relation to the CBT and on the role of imagery and analogy in understanding proverbs as opposed to metaphors.The authors wish to thank Suzanne Leake for help in designing the experiment, preparing materials, and running subjects.     

Figurative understanding of pictures and sentences

Figurative language use involves the appropriate relatings of normally discrepant domains of knowledge. The present study determined whether college students could match a picture of the literal content of a proverb with a one-sentence target scenario which instantiated an interpretation of the proverb. More specifically, the subjects chose between a target scenario and a foil scenario designed to be a poorer instance of the interpretation. The results indicated that the subjects were successful despite the wide discrepancy in literal meaning between the pictures and scenarios. Supporting studies determined that this finding could not be attributed to response (scenario) bias or to certain characteristics of the pictures or of the scenarios alone. Apparently, the all important interaction between these materials induced the subjects to construct abstract ideas which served to relate the materials figuratively. Idea construction was heuristically described as involving analogic processes.The research was supported, in part, by a grant from the University Research Council of the University of Cincinnati to K. Voegtle.     

Proverb Comprehension: The Primacy of Literal Meaning

According to the multistage model of figurative language understanding, literal meanings must be developed before figurative meanings. Although the model implies that figurative understanding should take longer than literal understanding, Kemper (1981) reported that figuratively biased proverbs were processed more quickly than literalized proverbs. By contrast, in the present study the results from six experiments yielded the opposite conclusion. These results support the multistage model and the conceptual base theory of proverb comprehension (Honeck, 1997; Honeck & Temple, 1994; Honeck, Voegtle, Dorfmueller, & Hoffman, 1980) which incorporates it. Discrepancies between studies that have examined the multistage model may crucially depend on methodological factors such as type of experimental design, materials, and, as apparent in the present case, the task and dependent measure used.     

The conceptual basis of graded categories

Two implications of the Conceptual Base View of Categorization (Honeck, Kibler, & Sugar, 1985) were tested. First, to the extent that subjects form similar schemas or conceptual bases, their judgments of the exemplariness of various events should agree, and, second, whether a conceptual base is framed from verbal or pictorial inputs should not matter. To test these implications, subjects were provided different reference stimuli as guides for ranking a set of sentences in terms of how well they illustrated the deeper meaning of the reference stimuli. These stimuli were an excellent verbal instance of the figurative meaning of a proverb, a poor verbal instance of this meaning, an abstract picture representing this meaning, or nothing (control group). The results yielded four lines of evidence that were consistent with the Conceptual Base View.     

The bidirectionality of judgments of synonymy

This article reports an experiment and some observations on synonymy between sentences. The rationale derives from experimental evidence for the existence of a nonverbal, abstract semantic memory, and for the mutual deducibility of two synonymous sentences. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects ranked interpretations of proverbs in terms of their semantic distance from their proverb bases. In the second phase, different groups of subjects ranked proverbs, including the phase 1 original proverbs and some foils, in terms of their semantic distance from the interpretations. The results indicate that two synonymous sentences tend to be given similar rankings, linearly related, and that subjects are highly consensual in their rankings. It is argued that a deep structure account cannot explain the results and that, furthermore, available linguistic and psychological theories of meaning are likewise insufficient. Synonymy is discussed in terms of an event or operation which serves to restrict interpretation.     

Creation of Proverbial Wisdom in the Laboratory

This study represents an initial attempt to elicit the creation of proverbial statements in the laboratory. The cultural view of proverbs emphasizes their traditionality and social currency, while the cognitive view emphasizes their basic psychological functions (e.g., categorization). Using the cognitive framework, three experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, participants rated how well the moral of a brief story matched a cognitive-ideal (moral), where the stories either confirmed or disconfirmed an ideal. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to express the moral for these stories (generalize group), or express it so that others could use their wisdom (wisdom group). In Experiment 3, only the cognitive-ideals were presented, and per instruction, participants attempted to express them concretely, using examples (models). In general, the results indicated that moderately proverbial statements were generated most of the time and highly proverbial ones 10% of the time (Experiment 2) or 23% of the time (Experiment 3). There was a tendency for disconfirming stories to yield more proverbiality, particularly under the wisdom instruction. The nature of the stories, the mental set, and the accessibility of linguistic models all play a role in the production of proverbiality. Both the cognitive and cultural views are needed to explicate the overall proverb creation process.