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Nils Holtug 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(4):357-389
According to the Harm Principle, roughly, the state may coerce a person only if it can thereby prevent harm to others. Clearly, this principle depends crucially on what we understand by harm. Thus, if any sort of negative effect on a person may count as a harm, the Harm Principle will fail to sufficiently protect individual liberty. Therefore, a more subtle concept of harm is needed. I consider various possible conceptions and argue that none gives rise to a plausible version of the Harm Principle. Whether we focus on welfare, quantities of welfare or qualities of welfare, we do not arrive at a plausible version of this principle. Instead, the concept of harm may be moralized. I consider various ways this may be done as well as possible rationales for the resulting versions of the Harm Principle. Again, no plausible version of the principle turns up. I also consider the prospect of including the Harm Principle in a decision-procedure rather than in a criterion of rightness. Finally, in light of my negative appraisal, I briefly discuss why this principle has seemed so appealing to liberals. 相似文献
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Nils Holtug 《The Journal of Ethics》2001,5(4):361-384
In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, Ibriefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for ourmoral obligations to possible future people. 相似文献
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Res Publica - In the years to come, a great number of people are going to be displaced due to climate change. Climate refugees are going to migrate to find somewhere more hospitable to live. In... 相似文献
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Nils Holtug 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):169-189
Jeff McMahan appeals to what he calls the “Time-relative Interest Account of the Wrongness of Killing” to explain the wrongness
of killing individuals who are conscious but not autonomous. On this account, the wrongness of such killing depends on the
victim’s interest in his or her future, and this interest, in turn, depends on two things: the goods that would have accrued
to the victim in the future; and the strength of the prudential relations obtaining between the victim at the time of the
killing and at the times these goods would have accrued to him or her. More precisely, when assessing this interest, future
goods should be discounted to reflect reductions in the strength of such relations. Against McMahan’s account I argue that
it relies on an implausible “actualist” view of the moral importance of interests according to which satisfactions of future
interests only have moral significance if they are satisfactions of actual interests (interests that will in fact exist).
More precisely, I aim to show that the Time-relative Interest Account (1) does not have the implications for the morality
of killing that McMahan takes it to have, and (2) implies, implausibly, that certain interest satisfactions which seem to
be morally significant are morally insignificant because they are not satisfactions of actual interests. 相似文献
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Nils Holtug 《The Journal of Ethics》2001,5(4):419-419
Authors Index
Author Index Volume 5 相似文献7.
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