The association between risky decision making and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms: A preregistered assessment of need for cognition as underlying mechanism

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is related to suboptimal decision making in experimental tasks and to real-life risk-taking behavior (RTB) such as substance abuse and unsafe traffic conduct. In this preregistered study, we tested whether these associations are mediated by need for cognition—the extent to which one tends towards, and enjoys, analytical thought. In a large sample of young adults (N = 463, M_age = 19.7 years), we tested whether need for cognition mediated the association between self-reported ADHD symptoms on the one hand and decision-making strategy complexity on an experimental gambling task and self-reported real-life RTB on the other hand. Preregistered confirmatory analyses indicated first that ADHD symptoms were positively associated with real-life RTB, but the association was not mediated by need for cognition. Second, ADHD symptoms were not related to decision-making strategy complexity, and need for cognition was not a significant mediator. Explorative analyses revealed that (a) need for cognition was associated with higher decision-making accuracy and slower reaction time; (b) need for cognition was related to inattentive but not to hyperactive/impulsive ADHD symptoms; (c) need for cognition was associated with health-related RTB but not interpersonal RTB; and (4) only the association between inattention and health-related RTB was mediated by need for cognition. We conclude that need for cognition is not a mediator in the association between ADHD symptoms and RTB. Additionally, we conclude that neither ADHD symptoms nor need for cognition predict decision-making strategy complexity. Implications for both future research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Backward inhibition as a means of sequential task-set control: evidence for reduction of task competition

Endogenously initiated transitions between tasks are associated with inhibition of the attentional set for the task preceding the transition, as demonstrated by slowed reactions to a task most recently switched away from (U. Mayr & S. W. Keele, 2000). Using an altered methodological approach, the authors found that this backward inhibition counteracts perseverative tendencies when switching to a new task in that it selectively reduces interference exerted by the preceding task set. The reduction of interference was dependent on endogenous preparation for the new task and did not occur for unpredictable task switches or for task switches that were precued without information about the identity of the new task.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.     

A retrospective chart study: the pathway to a diagnosis for adults referred for ASD assessment

Charts of 125 adults (18 to 82 years), referred to an autism expert team for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) assessment, were reviewed to explore the pathway to an adulthood ASD diagnosis. The participants first contacted the mental health care clinic at a median age of 19 years (range 2 to 78 years). Men contacted the clinic slightly earlier than women. The main referral reasons were social problems, feelings of anxiety and mood disturbances. The most common earlier diagnoses were anxiety and mood disorders or psychosis-related disorders. These diagnoses were more common in women than in men. Surprisingly few differences emerged between those who finally received an ASD diagnosis and those who did not. However, those with an ASD diagnosis contacted the clinic a mean of 15 years earlier and less frequently received different former diagnoses, although the type of diagnoses did not differ. The diagnostic criteria that were prevalent during early childhood of these adults did not influence their diagnostic history. A quarter of these clients were known with social problems within the mental health care system, but ASD was not assessed. Hence, the current study shows that the pathways to an adulthood ASD diagnosis are very heterogeneous.     

Development of decision making: sequential versus integrative rules

Decisions can be made by applying a variety of decision-making rules-sequential rules in which decisions are based on a sequential evaluation of choice dimensions and the integrative normative rule in which decisions are based on an integration of choice dimensions. In this study, we investigated the developmental trajectory of such decision-making rules. In the Gambling Machine Task, participants choose between options that differ in three dimensions: frequency of loss, amount of loss, and certain gain. The task was administered to 231 children and adolescents (age range=8-17 years). Latent group analysis of their performance allowed precise classification of the underlying decision rules. The majority of participants used sequential decision rules, and the number of evaluated dimensions in these rules increased with age. Integrative rule use decreased with age. We discuss these results in light of traditional developmental theories and fuzzy trace theory.     

Preparatory adjustment of cognitive control in the task switching paradigm

In this article, the authors investigate the assumption that preparation while switching between cognitive tasks is dynamically adjusted to the current task demands. Performance in high-shift blocks (75% shifts) was compared with performance in high-repetition blocks (75% repetitions). This probability information was given either at the beginning of a block (global condition) or by specific probability cues before every trial (local condition). The authors report strong preparation effects (activation of the probable task and inhibition of the improbable task) in high-shift blocks, especially when specific probability cues were provided. In high-repetition blocks, however, the preparation effects were less pronounced. The results support the assumption that preparation is dynamically adjusted to the expected task requirements.     

Bioethics' gender

I argue that the field of bioethics is gendered feminine, but that the methods it uses to resist this gender identity pose real harm to actual women. Starting with an explanation of what I take 'gender' to be, I enumerate four drawbacks to being gendered feminine. I then argue that bioethics suffers from three of the same four drawbacks. I show how the field escapes the fourth disadvantage by adopting a masculine persona that inflicts damage on women, and conclude by urging bioethicists to reflect on their complicity in abusive power systems such as gender, race and class.     

The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis,Volume I Edited by John Frosch,in collaboration with Jacob A. Arlow,Nathaniel Ross,and Sidney Tarachow

Interaction analysis has become a standard tool for process-oriented research. Although now a researcher has a choice of instruments, the majority of these are based on the same concept of communication: the sender–receiver model. Communication is treated as a discrete and encoded process that progresses uniformly in time. We critically discuss these assumptions and the limits they put on communication research. It is asserted that instruments for interaction analysis based on the sender–receiver model restrict themselves to the more superficial levels of interaction and are unable to register the more significant events. Therefore they cannot account for a very essential feature of the communication process, namely the creation of meaning. Alternative options are discussed.