The association between risky decision making and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms: A preregistered assessment of need for cognition as underlying mechanism

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is related to suboptimal decision making in experimental tasks and to real-life risk-taking behavior (RTB) such as substance abuse and unsafe traffic conduct. In this preregistered study, we tested whether these associations are mediated by need for cognition—the extent to which one tends towards, and enjoys, analytical thought. In a large sample of young adults (N = 463, M_age = 19.7 years), we tested whether need for cognition mediated the association between self-reported ADHD symptoms on the one hand and decision-making strategy complexity on an experimental gambling task and self-reported real-life RTB on the other hand. Preregistered confirmatory analyses indicated first that ADHD symptoms were positively associated with real-life RTB, but the association was not mediated by need for cognition. Second, ADHD symptoms were not related to decision-making strategy complexity, and need for cognition was not a significant mediator. Explorative analyses revealed that (a) need for cognition was associated with higher decision-making accuracy and slower reaction time; (b) need for cognition was related to inattentive but not to hyperactive/impulsive ADHD symptoms; (c) need for cognition was associated with health-related RTB but not interpersonal RTB; and (4) only the association between inattention and health-related RTB was mediated by need for cognition. We conclude that need for cognition is not a mediator in the association between ADHD symptoms and RTB. Additionally, we conclude that neither ADHD symptoms nor need for cognition predict decision-making strategy complexity. Implications for both future research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Articulatory/phonetic sequencing at the level of the anterior perisylvian cortex: a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study

Damage to the anterior peri-intrasylvian cortex of the dominant hemisphere may give rise to a fairly consistent syndrome of articulatory deficits in the absence of relevant paresis of orofacial or laryngeal muscles (apraxia of speech, aphemia, or phonetic disintegration). The available clinical data are ambiguous with respect to the relevant lesion site, indicating either dysfunction of the premotor aspect of the lower precentral gyrus or the anterior insula in the depth of the Sylvian fissure. In order to further specify the functional anatomic substratum of this syndrome, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was performed during reiteration of syllables differing in their demands on articulatory/phonetic sequencing (CV versus CCCV versus CVCVCV). Horizontal tongue movements and a polysyllabic lexical item served as control conditions. Repetition of the CV and CCCV monosyllables elicited a rather bilateral symmetric hemodynamic response at the level of the anterior and posterior bank of the central sulcus (primary sensorimotor cortex), whereas a more limited area of neural activity arose within this domain during production of lexical and nonlexical polysyllables, significantly or exclusively lateralized toward the left hemisphere. There is neurophysiological evidence that primary sensorimotor cortex mediates the "fractionation" of movements. Assuming that the polysyllables considered are organized as coarticulated higher-order units, the observed restricted and lateralized cortical activation pattern, most presumably, reflects a mode of "nonindividualized" motor control posing fewer demands on "movement fractionation." These findings may explain the clinical observation of disproportionately worse repetition of trisyllabic items as compared to monosyllables in apraxia of speech. The various test materials failed to elicit significant activation of the anterior insula. If at all, only horizontal tongue movements yielded a hemodynamic reaction extending beyond the sensorimotor cortex to premotor areas. Since limbic projections target the inferior dorsolateral frontal lobe, the enlarged region of activation during horizontal tongue movements might reflect increased attentional requirements of this task.     

Backward inhibition as a means of sequential task-set control: evidence for reduction of task competition

Endogenously initiated transitions between tasks are associated with inhibition of the attentional set for the task preceding the transition, as demonstrated by slowed reactions to a task most recently switched away from (U. Mayr & S. W. Keele, 2000). Using an altered methodological approach, the authors found that this backward inhibition counteracts perseverative tendencies when switching to a new task in that it selectively reduces interference exerted by the preceding task set. The reduction of interference was dependent on endogenous preparation for the new task and did not occur for unpredictable task switches or for task switches that were precued without information about the identity of the new task.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.     

A retrospective chart study: the pathway to a diagnosis for adults referred for ASD assessment

Charts of 125 adults (18 to 82 years), referred to an autism expert team for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) assessment, were reviewed to explore the pathway to an adulthood ASD diagnosis. The participants first contacted the mental health care clinic at a median age of 19 years (range 2 to 78 years). Men contacted the clinic slightly earlier than women. The main referral reasons were social problems, feelings of anxiety and mood disturbances. The most common earlier diagnoses were anxiety and mood disorders or psychosis-related disorders. These diagnoses were more common in women than in men. Surprisingly few differences emerged between those who finally received an ASD diagnosis and those who did not. However, those with an ASD diagnosis contacted the clinic a mean of 15 years earlier and less frequently received different former diagnoses, although the type of diagnoses did not differ. The diagnostic criteria that were prevalent during early childhood of these adults did not influence their diagnostic history. A quarter of these clients were known with social problems within the mental health care system, but ASD was not assessed. Hence, the current study shows that the pathways to an adulthood ASD diagnosis are very heterogeneous.     

Development of decision making: sequential versus integrative rules

Decisions can be made by applying a variety of decision-making rules-sequential rules in which decisions are based on a sequential evaluation of choice dimensions and the integrative normative rule in which decisions are based on an integration of choice dimensions. In this study, we investigated the developmental trajectory of such decision-making rules. In the Gambling Machine Task, participants choose between options that differ in three dimensions: frequency of loss, amount of loss, and certain gain. The task was administered to 231 children and adolescents (age range=8-17 years). Latent group analysis of their performance allowed precise classification of the underlying decision rules. The majority of participants used sequential decision rules, and the number of evaluated dimensions in these rules increased with age. Integrative rule use decreased with age. We discuss these results in light of traditional developmental theories and fuzzy trace theory.     

Ability Emotional Intelligence Predicts Quality of Life beyond Personality,Affectivity, and Cognitive Intelligence

The current study explored the incremental validity of the ability emotional intelligence test to predict suicidal ideation (a subjective indicator of Quality of Life) beyond the ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions, affectivity, and general cognitive ability in a sample of 184 university students (mean age 29.50 years). Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that after controlling for demographic variables, the Big Five personality traits, affectivity, and the cognitive intelligence, the block of ability emotional intelligence scores explained a statistically significant increment of variance in suicidal ideation. It is noteworthy that the predictive power of the ability emotional intelligence appeared to be mostly due to the contribution of its two branch scores–regulation of emotion and understanding of emotion. Findings are discussed with reference to emotional intelligence theory and suicidal behaviors.     

Preparatory adjustment of cognitive control in the task switching paradigm

In this article, the authors investigate the assumption that preparation while switching between cognitive tasks is dynamically adjusted to the current task demands. Performance in high-shift blocks (75% shifts) was compared with performance in high-repetition blocks (75% repetitions). This probability information was given either at the beginning of a block (global condition) or by specific probability cues before every trial (local condition). The authors report strong preparation effects (activation of the probable task and inhibition of the improbable task) in high-shift blocks, especially when specific probability cues were provided. In high-repetition blocks, however, the preparation effects were less pronounced. The results support the assumption that preparation is dynamically adjusted to the expected task requirements.