Book reviews

Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett, 1995. London, Penguin. 587 pp., hbk £25, ISBN: 0–713–99090–2

Verificationism: Its History and Prospects, C. J. Misak, 1995. London and New York, Routledge. xviii + 254 pp. ISBN: 0–415–12597–9(hbk); 0–415–12598–7(pbk)

Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology, John R. Josephson & Susan G. Josephson (Eds), 1994. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 306 pp.

Physics and Metaphysics. Theories of Space and Time, Jennifer Trusted, 1994. London, Routledge 210 pp.     

Inductive Incompleteness

Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory.     

The Diachronic Coherence of Ungraded Beliefs

This paper works within a model of ungraded belief that characterizes epistemic states as logically closed and consistent sets of sentences. The aim of this paper is to discuss three diachronic coherence conditions for such beliefs. These coherence conditions are formulated in terms of the reasoner's present beliefs about how his present beliefs will evolve in the future, for instance, in response to different pieces of future evidence.     

The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization

I re-examine Coherence Arguments (Dutch Book Arguments, No Arbitrage Arguments) for diachronic constraints on Bayesian reasoning. I suggest to replace the usual game–theoretic coherence condition with a new decision–theoretic condition ('Diachronic Sure Thing Principle'). The new condition meets a large part of the standard objections against the Coherence Argument and frees it, in particular, from a commitment to additive utilities. It also facilitates the proof of the Converse Dutch Book Theorem. I first apply the improved Coherence Argument to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle. I then point out the failure of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule. I also point out that Reflection is incompatible with the universal use of Conditionalization thus interpreted. The Coherence Argument therefore defeats the naive view on Bayesian learning that it was originally designed to justify. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Auto-Epistemology and Updating

Philosophical Studies -     

Asking Difficult Questions: Task Complexity Increases the Impact of Response Alternatives

In providing behavioural frequency reports, respondents use the range of the response alternatives as a frame of reference, resulting in higher estimates on scales that offer high rather than low values. The present study demonstrates that the size of this effect increases with increasing question difficulty.