The size coding of responses: The size of switches and the force feedback

We aimed to understand which factors have a functional role in the size coding of responses, either the size of the switches or the force required to trigger each switch. This question is of relevance because it allows a better understanding of processes underlying action coding. In each trial, participants saw a small or large object. Depending on its colour, the participants had to press one of two switches. In the “size” condition, the response device consisted of two switches of different visual size, but both required the same amount of force. In the “force-feedback” condition, the response device consisted in two switches of identical visual size, but one switch required more force than the other. We found a compatibility effect in the “size,” not in the “force-feedback” condition, supporting that the size-coding of responses would be due to the size of the switches.     

Motor simulation in tool-use effect on distance estimation: A replication of Witt and Proffitt (2008)

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Witt and Proffit (Human Perception and Performance, 34 (6), 1479–1492, 2008) hypothesized that when people intend to reach a target, they run a motor...     

The embodied cognition theory and the motor component of “yes” and “no” verbal responses

Most of the experiments which give theories of embodied cognition their empirical anchorage only take into consideration the motor responses induced by the task or the motor component of the visual stimulus. And yet, these motor responses are often associated with a linguistic answer. Our hypothesis is that “YES” and “NO” verbal responses have a motor component. In a first experiment we showed that producing a verbal response (YES vs. NO) involves motor planning (pushing vs. pulling): participants push a lever more quickly when they have to answer “yes” than “no”, and conversely, they pull a lever more quickly when they have to answer “no” than “yes”. Moreover, in a second experiment, we showed that perceiving the words “YES” and “NO”, on its own, leads to the same motor planning than when “yes” and “no” answers actually have to be produced. Participants detect the word “YES” faster when they have to push a lever than when they have to pull it and conversely they detect the word “NO” faster when they have to pull the lever than when they have to push it down. These results are discussed in reference to “online” and “offline embodiment” concepts and to the cognitive linguistic theories.     

Color perception involves color representations firstly at a semantic level and then at a lexical level

Studies and models have suggested that color perception first involves access to semantic representations of color. This result leads to two questions: (1) is knowledge able to influence the perception of color when associated with a color? and (2) can the perception of color really involve only semantic representations? We developed an experiment where participants have to discriminate the color of a patch (yellow vs. green). The target patch is preceded either by a black-and-white line drawing or by a word representing a natural object associated with the same or a different color (banana vs. frog). We expected a priming effect for pictures because, with a 350-ms SOA, they only involve access to semantic representations of color, whereas words seem only elicit an access to lexical representations. As expected, we found a priming effect for pictures, but also for words. Moreover, we found a general slowdown of response times in the word-prime-condition suggesting the need of an additional processing step to produce priming. In a second experiment, we manipulated the SOA in order to preclude a semantic access in the word-prime-condition that could explain the additional step of processing. We also found a priming effect, suggesting that interaction with perception occurs at a lexical level and the additional step occurs at a color perception level. In the discussion, we develop a new model of color perception assuming that color perception involves access to semantic representations and then access to lexical representations.     

Word‐to‐picture recognition is a function of motor components mappings at the stage of retrieval

Embodied approaches of cognition argue that retrieval involves the re‐enactment of both sensory and motor components of the desired remembering. In this study, we investigated the effect of motor action performed to produce the response in a recognition task when this action is compatible with the affordance of the objects that have to be recognised. In our experiment, participants were first asked to learn a list of words referring to graspable objects, and then told to make recognition judgements on pictures. The pictures represented objects where the graspable part was either pointing to the same or to the opposite side of the “Yes” response key. Results show a robust effect of compatibility between objects affordance and response hand. Moreover, this compatibility improves participants' ability of discrimination, suggesting that motor components are relevant cue for memory judgement at the stage of retrieval in a recognition task. More broadly, our data highlight that memory judgements are a function of motor components mappings at the stage of retrieval.