Living Being and Speaking Being: Toward a Dialogical Approach to Intentionality

One of the main goals of cognitive science is to shed light on human knowledge. This paper states that, if daily conversations, literature, and private thought, are proper expressions of human behavior, then cognitive sciences ought to elaborate a concept of knowledge suited to this kind of activities. I draw upon the notion of discourse in Bakhtin to specify the attributes of knowing needed to account for human behavior, whose manifestations in everyday life are not reduced to representing objects but essentially oriented toward responding to others. As a central aspect of knowledge, I focus on intentionality and offer a discussion about different aspects of it. Specifically, I examine the difference between intentionality as the faculty of representation (aboutness) and intentionality as the subjective positioning toward contextually relevant ideological perspectives (meaning).

System‐perpetuating asymmetries between explicit and implicit intergroup attitudes among indigenous and non‐indigenous Chileans

The present research demonstrates a dissociation between explicit and implicit intergroup evaluation in the reciprocal attitudes between indigenous (Mapuche) and non‐indigenous Chileans. In both social groups, the explicit measures of attitudes towards the respective in‐group and out‐group were compared with the Implicit Association Test scores. The results indicate that the members of the low‐status minority might explicitly express a moderate evaluative preference for their in‐group but might implicitly devalue it. Conversely, the members of the high‐status majority might implicitly devalue their out‐group but might explicitly express no bias. These results are theoretically framed in terms of system justification, conventional stereotypes and motivated correction processes.     

A methodological note about the measurement of the false‐consensus effect

Although the existence of the false consensus effect is beyond all doubt, its interpretation as a judgemental bias is still a matter of debate. Krueger recently proposed a new measure for this phenomenon, called the truly false consensus effect (TFCE). This measure consists of correlating the subject's endorsement of each item with the error he or she made in estimating the popularity of that same item. I question the validity of this measure, arguing that it could be negative even in cases where false consensus is at work. I present an inter‐group study where participants made percentage estimates for various behaviours. The results yielded a significantly negative TFCE, although other measures of false consensus demonstrate that the phenomenon is present. I discuss the differences between Krueger's studies and my own, and suggest that a better measure of false consensus might be the particle correlation between endorsement and estimated popularity, controlling for true popularity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

James’s theory of emotion and affective turn in psychology / La teoría de las emociones de James y el giro afectivo en psicología

Using William James’s classical theory of the emotions, this article discusses the way the relationship between cognition and emotion are predominantly explained and operationalized in contemporary psychology and neuroscience research. Specific aspects of James’s theory are reconstructed, connecting his more general philosophical framework with arguments about the relationship between subjective experience and the process of corporal change. A review published in the journal Cognition & Emotion (C&E) (2001–11) concludes that almost all its literature is based on the idea of interaction between two different processes, while James suggests that the process of experience is one and the same. Dialogue between these two scenarios facilitates the identification of current research potentialities in terms of mixed-method studies and with emphasis on the temporality of action, overall physiological change, and uniqueness of experience.