Auditory Long term Memory: Repetition Priming of Voice Recognition

Two experiments examined repetition priming in the recognition of famous voices. In Experiment 1, reaction times for fame decisions to famous voice samples were shorter than in an unprimed condition, when voices were primed by a different voice sample of the same person having been presented in an earlier phase of the experiment. No effect of voice repetition was observed for non-famous voices. In Experiment 2, it was investigated whether this priming effect is voice-specific or whether it is related to post-perceptual processes in person recognition. Recognizing a famous voice was again primed by having earlier heard a different voice sample of that person. Although an earlier exposure to that person's name did not cause any priming, there was some indication of priming following an earlier exposure to that person's face. Finally, earlier exposure to the identical voice sample (as compared to a different voice sample from the same person) caused a considerable bias towards responding 'famous'-i.e. performance benefits for famous but costs for nonfamous voices. The findings suggestthat (1) repetition priming invoice recognition primarily involves the activation of perceptual representations of voices, and (2) it is important to determine the conditions in which priming causes bias effects that need to be disentangled from performance benefits.     

SUBJECTIVISM,UTILITY, AND AUTONOMY

Taking as a starting point a thesis of David Gauthier's about the status of Rational Choice Theory. I discuss the relation between a subjectivist theory of value and an account of rational agency that leaves room for autonomy. I argue that if autonomy presupposes an activity of practical reason, the maximization of subjective expected utility (as prescribed by Rational Choice Theory) cannot serve as the principle of practical reason.     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

Jury selection in two countries: a psychological perspective

A comparative survey of jury selection practices in Britain and the United States indicates that the two countries differ along a number of dimensions, including the emphasis on the jury selection process in the trial, the amount and type of information available about prospective jurors, and the frequency with which trial lawyers alter the composition of the jury. The probable impact of these differences is analysed by considering the importance of jury composition in determining a jury’s verdict, the effectiveness of lawyers in exercising their challenges, and broader effects of jury selection procedures in the two countries.     

Diurnal variation,morningness-eveningness,and momentary affect

The research questions of this study are the following: To what degree can results such as those of Thayer and colleagues (1978a, 1985, 1986, 1988) concerning diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types, obtained for energetic and tense arousal, be (1) replicated, (2) extended to elation and pleasantness, and (3) generalized to positive and negative affect? With regard to energetic arousal, all results were in line with those of Thayer and colleagues. However, regarding tense arousal, there was an unexpected main effect for time of day. For energetic arousal, elation, pleasantness, positive affect, and negative affect, there was (a) a significant main eflect for time of day, (b) a quadratic trend for diurnal variation, and (c) a significant Diurnal Type × Time of Day interaction, There were no significant sex differences in diurnal variation. Two final hypothetical statements are made about the diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types with regard to state scales: (a) the diurnal variation of a state scale cannot be described with a quadratic function if that scale is completely unrelated to energetic arousal; and (b) the characteristic differences between morning types and evening types, especially when measured in the morning and in the evening, will not manifest themselves on a state scale if that scale is entirely unrelated to energetic arousal. Finally, the possible usefulness of the results of this study for practical applications and the development of theories are discussed.     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.