SUBJECTIVISM,UTILITY, AND AUTONOMY

Taking as a starting point a thesis of David Gauthier's about the status of Rational Choice Theory. I discuss the relation between a subjectivist theory of value and an account of rational agency that leaves room for autonomy. I argue that if autonomy presupposes an activity of practical reason, the maximization of subjective expected utility (as prescribed by Rational Choice Theory) cannot serve as the principle of practical reason.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Beyond principal component analysis: A trilinear decomposition model and least squares estimation

The paper derives sufficient conditions for the consistency and asymptotic normality of the least squares estimator of a trilinear decomposition model for multiway data analysis.     

On the transmission of partial information: inferences from movement-related brain potentials.

Results are reported from a new paradigm that uses movement-related brain potentials to detect response preparation based on partial information. The paradigm uses a hybrid choice-reaction go/nogo procedure in which decisions about response hand and whether to respond are based on separate stimulus attributes. A lateral asymmetry in the movement-related brain potential was found on nogo trials without overt movement. The direction of this asymmetry depended primarily on the signaled response hand rather than on properties of the stimulus. When the asymmetry first appeared was influenced by the time required to select the signaled hand, and when it began to differ on go and nogo trials was influenced by the time to decide whether to respond. These findings indicate that both stimulus attributes were processed in parallel and that the asymmetry reflected preparation of the response hand that began before the go/nogo decision was completed.     

Jury selection in two countries: a psychological perspective

A comparative survey of jury selection practices in Britain and the United States indicates that the two countries differ along a number of dimensions, including the emphasis on the jury selection process in the trial, the amount and type of information available about prospective jurors, and the frequency with which trial lawyers alter the composition of the jury. The probable impact of these differences is analysed by considering the importance of jury composition in determining a jury’s verdict, the effectiveness of lawyers in exercising their challenges, and broader effects of jury selection procedures in the two countries.     

Diurnal variation,morningness-eveningness,and momentary affect

The research questions of this study are the following: To what degree can results such as those of Thayer and colleagues (1978a, 1985, 1986, 1988) concerning diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types, obtained for energetic and tense arousal, be (1) replicated, (2) extended to elation and pleasantness, and (3) generalized to positive and negative affect? With regard to energetic arousal, all results were in line with those of Thayer and colleagues. However, regarding tense arousal, there was an unexpected main effect for time of day. For energetic arousal, elation, pleasantness, positive affect, and negative affect, there was (a) a significant main eflect for time of day, (b) a quadratic trend for diurnal variation, and (c) a significant Diurnal Type × Time of Day interaction, There were no significant sex differences in diurnal variation. Two final hypothetical statements are made about the diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types with regard to state scales: (a) the diurnal variation of a state scale cannot be described with a quadratic function if that scale is completely unrelated to energetic arousal; and (b) the characteristic differences between morning types and evening types, especially when measured in the morning and in the evening, will not manifest themselves on a state scale if that scale is entirely unrelated to energetic arousal. Finally, the possible usefulness of the results of this study for practical applications and the development of theories are discussed.