SUBJECTIVISM,UTILITY, AND AUTONOMY

Taking as a starting point a thesis of David Gauthier's about the status of Rational Choice Theory. I discuss the relation between a subjectivist theory of value and an account of rational agency that leaves room for autonomy. I argue that if autonomy presupposes an activity of practical reason, the maximization of subjective expected utility (as prescribed by Rational Choice Theory) cannot serve as the principle of practical reason.     

On the role of imagery in linear syllogistic reasoning

Summary The functional role of imagery in linear syllogistic reasoning has not yet been convincingly established. Shortcomings of previous theories and research are discussed. A conceptual analysis of the imagery position leads to the differentiation of modality-specific, analogical-representational, and process perspectives. To obtain evidence relevant to the first and third of these perspectives, a Stroop-type interference paradigm was used in combination with self-paced successive presentation of task components (premises and question of linear syllogisms). Effects of interference information and task components upon response time were consistent with the process reconceptualization of the imagery position.     

Jury selection in two countries: a psychological perspective

A comparative survey of jury selection practices in Britain and the United States indicates that the two countries differ along a number of dimensions, including the emphasis on the jury selection process in the trial, the amount and type of information available about prospective jurors, and the frequency with which trial lawyers alter the composition of the jury. The probable impact of these differences is analysed by considering the importance of jury composition in determining a jury’s verdict, the effectiveness of lawyers in exercising their challenges, and broader effects of jury selection procedures in the two countries.     

Diurnal variation,morningness-eveningness,and momentary affect

The research questions of this study are the following: To what degree can results such as those of Thayer and colleagues (1978a, 1985, 1986, 1988) concerning diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types, obtained for energetic and tense arousal, be (1) replicated, (2) extended to elation and pleasantness, and (3) generalized to positive and negative affect? With regard to energetic arousal, all results were in line with those of Thayer and colleagues. However, regarding tense arousal, there was an unexpected main effect for time of day. For energetic arousal, elation, pleasantness, positive affect, and negative affect, there was (a) a significant main eflect for time of day, (b) a quadratic trend for diurnal variation, and (c) a significant Diurnal Type × Time of Day interaction, There were no significant sex differences in diurnal variation. Two final hypothetical statements are made about the diurnal variation and differences between diurnal types with regard to state scales: (a) the diurnal variation of a state scale cannot be described with a quadratic function if that scale is completely unrelated to energetic arousal; and (b) the characteristic differences between morning types and evening types, especially when measured in the morning and in the evening, will not manifest themselves on a state scale if that scale is entirely unrelated to energetic arousal. Finally, the possible usefulness of the results of this study for practical applications and the development of theories are discussed.     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.