Two stages in postcategorical filtering and selection

Memory &; Cognition - In a modified Stroop paradigm, Kahneman and Henik (1981) varied the spatial location of incompatible color words in relation to the position of the ink color to be named. A...     

Time courses in visual-information processing: Some empirical evidence for inhibition

Summary In the literature two different views on the time course of activation of recognition units — hypothetical units that represent identity information — are proposed. The first view assumes that the recognition units accumulate activation gradually over time. The second assumes that the activation levels increase fast initially and then start to decrease. Hagenzieker and Van der Heijden (1990) have proposed a more general information-processing model, which is compatible with both views. In this model a treshold determines what type of time course will be obtained. For below-threshold-activation values a gradual accumulation of activation will be found; for above-threshold values activation levels will first increase and then, because of inhibition, decrease. This model served as a starting-point for the present paper. Elaboration of this model led to two testable hypotheses with regard to identification performance. The first prediction is that evidence for inhibition should be observed only under relatively bright luminance conditions. The second is that, given inhibition, the amount of the effect of this inhibition should increase over time. A partial-report bar-probe task was used to test the predictions. The experiment involved two luminance conditions and the information was sampled at two different moments in time. To control for possible localization artefacts a digit-naming task was also used. Evidence for inhibition was found in both luminance conditions. In accordance with the model the amount of the effect of inhibition increased over time.     

Location errors in partial-report bar-probe experiments: In search of the origin of cue-alignment problems

In studies using Averbach and Coriell’s (1961) partial-report bar-probe paradigm with linear arrays, most errors involve the naming of an item that was in the display but in a position other than the cued one. Up to now, there is no general agreement on the origin of these location errors. Point of departure in this paper is that part of the location errors arises from inappropriate application of the cue. It is tested whether this originates from problems to perceive the position of the cue (“cue-displacement hypothesis”) or from confusion about the order of the items in the array (“item-order hypothesis”). The results of two bar-probe experiments are reported. A novel, crucial, finding in both experiments is that, among the location errors, there was a preponderance of response letters that came from the central side of the cued item. In the second experiment, this was observed not only in the usual postcue conditions but also when the cue preceded the array. These results positively corroborate the cue-displacement hypothesis and do not support the item-order hypothesis: The cue tends to be perceived more toward the center of the visual field than it actually is exposed—that is, there is a central drift of the cue.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.