First Nations Career/Life Planning Model: Guidelines for Practitioners

Guidelines for using the First Nations Career/Life Planning Model with youth are outlined along with suggestions for future practice regarding recruitment of participants, the counseling process, and postsession considerations. One session is described in detail to exemplify how the model is used in practice.     

Eliciting false memories on implicit and explicit memory tests after incidental learning

Abstract: In a false memory experiment, lists of semantic associates (e.g., newspaper, letter, book, etc.) were presented to three groups of participants to induce false memories for critical nonpresented (CN) words (e.g., read) in an incidental learning task. The control group simply estimated the frequency rate in everyday Japanese discourse of each word on a list. The imagery instruction group received an additional instruction to imagine a thematically related converging word from the target words on a list. Participants in the imagery plus writing group received the same instructions as those in the imagery instruction group, but were also required to write down the word they imagined for each list. The results from the implicit and explicit memory tests given after the incidental learning episode showed that the level of priming for CN words was equivalent to that for actually presented target words for all three groups on the implicit test, whereas explicit memory results showed that participants explicitly recognized more target words than CN words. The implications for implicit associative response and fuzzy‐trace theories of false memory, as well as implicit priming, are discussed.     

Effects of self‐explanation as a metacognitive strategy for solving mathematical word problems1

Abstract: This study examined how a metacognitive strategy known as self‐explanation influences word problem solving in elementary school children. Participants were 79 sixth‐graders. They were assigned to one of three groups: the self‐explanation group, the self‐learning group, or the control group. Students in each group performed a ratio word problem test and a transfer test. The results showed that students in the self‐explanation group outperformed students in the other two groups on both the ratio word problem test and on the transfer test. In addition, high explainers who generated more self‐explanations relating to deep understanding of worked‐out examples outperformed low explainers on both ratio word problem and transfer tests. The self‐explanation effect is discussed.     

A Case for Apathy

ABSTRACT Apathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision-making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than after its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a 'voluntary decision'to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrational.