Will you confess to what I did? Close relationships and in-group membership facilitate voluntary blame-taking

To learn more about why people falsely confess without external pressure, we examined voluntary blame-taking in three experiments. Drawing from theories of prosocial behavior and social identity, we investigated whether participants' blame-taking is influenced by (a) their relationship with the guilty person (Experiment 1) and (b) the group membership of the person asking to take the blame (Experiments 2a and 2b). In Experiment 1, participants (N = 130) considered whether they would take the blame for a small traffic violation for their best friend and a stranger in a vignette-scenario. As expected, intended blame-taking rates were higher for their best friend (60.8%) than for a stranger (8.5%). Reported reasons for taking the blame included reciprocity and empathy. In Experiments 2a and 2b (Ns = 60; 89), we tested actual blame-taking behavior in two field experiments, using a new experimental paradigm. An experimenter approached participants and asked them to commit insurance fraud for a broken camera. Participants who shared the same group as the person in need were more willing to take the blame (47%-48%) than participants who were from a different group (21%-23%). The most frequently listed reason for taking the blame was empathy. Implications for the occurrence of voluntary blame-taking behavior to protect someone else are discussed.     

What chance-credence norms should be

Synthese - Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam (1967) supposed it to be...     

The Modal Logic of Bayesian Belief Revision

In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable.