排序方式: 共有7条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Synthese - The paper discusses an objection, put forward by—among others—John McDowell, to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s non-factualist and relativist view of semantic discourse.... 相似文献
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Philosophia - The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does... 相似文献
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Andrea Guardo 《Philosophia》2014,42(3):749-759
The paper discusses Saul Kripke's Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: it criticizes the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defends an alternative reading and argues that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative. According to the orthodox interpretation, the argument can be summarized as follows: (1) it is constitutive of the concept of meaning that its instances imply an ought, but (2) it is not constitutive of the concept of a disposition that dispositions imply an ought, hence (3) no dispositional analysis of meaning can work. According to my alternative reading, the point of the argument is another one, namely that while (1) dispositionalism is committed to the thesis that speakers have non-inferential knowledge of their unmanifested linguistic dispositions, (2) speakers, as a matter of fact, do not have such a knowledge. A point that is in principle independent from the issue of the normativity of meaning. 相似文献
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Andrea Guardo 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):195-209
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions
to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The
first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of
meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on
Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions
that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call ‘Actuality Constraint’. The third section of the
paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional
analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian).
This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a
possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show
(1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible
to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by ‘+’ do not
exist. 相似文献
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Andrea Guardo 《European Journal of Philosophy》2012,20(3):366-388
Abstract: This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke (1982) ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by‐product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behaviour is outlined, a conception that vindicates some of the insights behind Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical solution of the paradox. This alternative conception is defended against two objections (both familiar from McDowell's works): (1) that it would imply that for the linguistic community there is no authority, no standard to meet and, therefore, no possibility of error and (2) that it would lead to a kind of idealism. 相似文献
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