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Dirk Greimann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2003,34(1):15-41
The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be
coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically
respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma.
To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant’s constructive objectivism, Jürgen Habermas’ “epistemic ersatzism”,
Franz von Kutschera’s “confirmation pragmatism”, and David Brink’s “objectivist tour de force”. The paper’s conclusion is
that the dilemma cannot be solved because it rests on a clash of intuitions none of which can be given up.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Dirk Greimann 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(5):425-442
The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant because the sense of the word ‘true’ does not make any essential contribution to the senses of the sentences in which it occurs. 相似文献
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Dirk Greimann 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(3):272-288
In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical laws play vis-à-vis judgement, assertion and inference. My aim in this paper is to develop and defend an alternative reconstruction according to which Frege stresses that logic is not only concerned with ‘how thoughts follow from other thoughts’, but also with the ‘step from thought to truth-value’. Frege considers logic as a branch of the theory of justification. To justify a conclusion by means of a logical inference, the ‘step from thought to truth-value’ must be taken, that is, the premises must be asserted as true. It is for this reason that, in the final analysis, the assertoric force indicates the essence of logic, for Frege. 相似文献
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D. Greimann 《Erkenntnis》2000,52(2):213-238
The syntax of Frege's scientific language iscommonly taken to be characterized by two oddities:the representation of the intended illocutionary roleof sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke,and the treatment of sentences as a species ofsingular terms. In this paper, an alternative view isdefended. The main theses are: (i) the syntax ofFrege's scientific language aims at an explication ofthe logical form of judgements; (ii) thejudgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, nota pragmatic operator; (iii) in Frege's first system,` ' expresses that the circumstance is a fact, and in his second system that thetruth-value - is the True; (iv) in bothsystems, the judgement-stroke is construed as a signsui generis, not as a genuine predicate; (v) itscounterpart in natural language is the syntactic ``formof assertoric sentences', not the (redundant)truth-predicate; (vi) neither in Frege's first nor inhis second system sentences are treated as singular terms. 相似文献
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Dirk Greimann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2000,31(1):133-155
This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected
because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions.
The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly
powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a proposition to be true.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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