Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

Determination of a behavioral transfer function: White-noise analysis of session-to-session response-ratio dynamics on concurrent VI VI schedules

Six pigeons were exposed to concurrent variable-interval schedules in which the programmed reinforcer ratios changed from session to session according to a pseudorandom binary sequence. This procedure corresponded to the stochastic identification paradigm (“white-noise experiment”) of systems theory and enabled the relation between log response ratios in the current session and log reinforcer ratios in all previous sessions to be determined. Such dynamic relations are called linear transfer functions. Both nonparametric and parametric representations of these, in the form of “impulse-response functions,” were determined for each bird. The session-to-session response ratios resulting from the session-to-session pseudorandom binary variations in reinforcer ratios were well predicted by the impulse-response functions identified for each pigeon. The impulse-response functions were well fitted by a second-order dynamic model involving only two parameters: a time constant and a gain. The mean time constant was 0.67 sessions, implying that the effects of abrupt changes in log reinforcer ratios should be 96% complete within about five sessions. The mean gain was 0.53, which was surprisingly low inasmuch as it should equal the sensitivity to reinforcement ratio observed under steady-state conditions. The same six pigeons were subjected to a similar experiment 10 months following the first. Despite individual differences in impulse-response functions between birds within each experiment, the impulse-response functions determined from the two experiments were essentially the same.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

Why do males and females differ? Children's beliefs about sex differences

The present paper focuses on children's beliefs about sex differences and how these are related to age and gender. Seven, ten, and fifteen year olds (N=427) were asked to give explanations for their beliefs about sex differences. In strong agreement with previous research and the cognitive-developmental theoretical framework, marked age differences were found: younger children were more likely than older children to emphasize biological and physical factors. Significant gender differences were also found, especially for 15 year olds. Girls were much more likely to attribute sex differences to social factors, and boys to biological factors. These gender differences were interpreted as being indicative of different life experiences of males and females, with females being more likely to have experienced conflicts between their own values about sex-role behavior and those of society. Findings were also interpreted as being consistent with the recent emphasis on gender schema. Nevertheless, it was argued that theories of gender schema need to take more account of content—of the beliefs that people hold about sex roles—and, in particular, that more attention be given to exploring gender differences in beliefs.