Spatial knowledge in a young blind child

A set of eight experiments demonstrate spatial knowledge in a 2-year-old congenitally blind child and sighted blindfolded controls. Once the blind child had traveled along specific paths between objects in a novel array, she was able to make spatial inferences, finding new routes between those objects (Experiment 1). She could also do so when the routes were between places in space, not occupied by objects (Experiment II). Deviations from precisely straight routes in Experiments I and II were not due to faulty inferences, but probably came from imprecise motor control, since the same deviations occured when inferences were not required—when the child moved to a place designated by a sound source (Experiment III). This child's performances could not be accounted for by artifactual explanations: sound cues, experimenter bias, and echolocation were ruled out (Experiments IV, V, VI). Further, sighted blindfolded controls performed at roughly the same level (Experiment VII). Finally, Experiment VIII shows that the blind child could access her spatial knowledge for use in a simple map-reading task. We conclude that the young blind child has a system of spatial knowledge, including abstract, amodal rules     

A conceptual category effect in visual search: O as letter or as digit

Evidence is presented for a processing mechanism in visual recognition that depends upon how the stimulus array is conceptually categorized rather than upon its physical characteristics. Ss had to detect a letter or digit target in a field of letters or digits. When target and field were of the same category, reaction time increased with display size. When target and field category differed, reaction times were independent of display size. This category effect held even for the ambiguous target character 0 that yielded reaction time functions appropriate to how it was specified prior to presentation: as “zero” or as “ō.”     

On the semantic content of subcategorization frames

This paper investigates relations between the meanings of verbs and the syntactic structures in which they appear. This investigation is motivated by the enigmas as to how children discover verb meanings. Well-known problems with unconstrained induction of word meanings from observation of world circumstances suggest that additional constraints or sources of information are required. If there exist strong and reliable parallels between the structural and semantic properties of verbs, then an additional source of information about verb meanings is reliably present in each verb's linguistic context. Five experiments are presented which investigate the following hypothesis regarding the scope of these relations: The closer any two verbs in their semantic structure, the greater the overlap should be in their licensed syntactic structures. To investigate this hypothesis, data of two kinds were collected from different groups of subjects: (a) One group of subjects was asked to judge the semantic relatedness of verbs by selecting the semantic outlier in triads presented to them. (b) A second group of subjects was asked to judge the grammaticality of these same verbs in a large range of syntactic environments. These two types of data were then compared to assess the degree of correspondence in the two partitionings (syntactic and semantic) of the verb set. The findings, overall, support the view that the syntax of verbs is a quite regular, although complex, projection from their semantics. In conclusion, we discuss the kinds of features that are formally marked in syntactic structure and relate these to the problem of verb-vocabulary acquisition in young children.     

The cost of categorization in visual search: Incomplete processing of targets and field items

A partial processing hypothesis is proposed to account for performance under a visual search condition where target and field items belong to the different conceptual categories, letter and digit (between-category search), as compared to a condition in which they belong to the same category (within-category search). This hypothesized mechanism implies that less information is registered and/or retained in between- than in within-category search. This prediction was tested and confirmed in three experiments. The results indicate that both targets and field items are processed less deeply in between- than in within-category search.     

One Frog, Two Frog, Red Frog, Blue Frog: Factors Affecting Children's Syntactic Choices in Production and Comprehension

Two experiments are reported which examine children's ability to use referential context when making syntactic choices in language production and comprehension. In a recent on-line study of auditory comprehension, Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, and Logrip (1999) examined children's and adults' abilities to resolve temporary syntactic ambiguities involving prepositional phrases (e.g., “Put the frog on the napkin into ¨”). Although adults and older children used the referential context to guide their initial analysis (pursuing a destination interpretation in a one-frog context and a modifier interpretation in a two-frog context), 4 to 5-year olds' initial and ultimate analysis was one of destination, regardless of context. The present studies examined whether these differences were attributable to the comprehension process itself or to other sources, such as possible differences in how children perceive the scene and referential situation. In both experiments, children were given a language generation task designed to elicit and test children's ability to refer to a member of a set through restrictive modification. This task was immediately followed by the “put” comprehension task. The findings showed that, in response to a question about a member of a set (e.g., “Which frog went to Mrs. Squid's house?”), 4- to 5-year-olds frequently produced a definite NP with a restrictive prepositional modifier (e.g., “The one on the napkin”). These same children, however, continued to misanalyze put instructions, showing a strong avoidance of restrictive modification during comprehension. Experiment 2 showed that an increase in the salience of the platforms that distinguished the two referents increased overall performance, but still showed the strong asymmetry between production and comprehension. Eye movements were also recorded in Experiment 2, revealing on-line parsing patterns similar to Trueswell et al.: an initial preference for a destination analysis and a failure to revise early referential commitments. These experiments indicate that child–adult differences in parsing preferences arise, in part, from developmental changes in the comprehension process itself and not from a general insensitivity to referential properties of the scene. The findings are consistent with a probabilistic model for uncovering the structure of the input during comprehension, in which more reliable linguistic and discourse-related cues are learned first, followed by a gradually developing ability to take into account other more uncertain (or more difficult to learn) cues to structure.     

Spatial reasoning in Tenejapan Mayans

Language communities differ in their stock of reference frames (coordinate systems for specifying locations and directions). English typically uses egocentrically-defined axes (e.g., “left–right”), especially when describing small-scale relationships. Other languages such as Tseltal Mayan prefer to use geocentrically-defined axes (e.g., “north–south”) and do not use any type of projective body-defined axes. It has been argued that the availability of specific frames of reference in language determines the availability or salience of the corresponding spatial concepts. In four experiments, we explored this hypothesis by testing Tseltal speakers’ spatial reasoning skills. Whereas most prior tasks in this domain were open-ended (allowing several correct solutions), the present tasks required a unique solution that favored adopting a frame-of-reference that was either congruent or incongruent with what is habitually lexicalized in the participants’ language. In these tasks, Tseltal speakers easily solved the language-incongruent problems, and performance was generally more robust for these than for the language-congruent problems that favored geocentrically-defined coordinates. We suggest that listeners’ probabilistic inferences when instruction is open to more than one interpretation account for why there are greater cross-linguistic differences in the solutions to open-ended spatial problems than to less ambiguous ones.     

Object and observer motion in the perception of objects by infants

Sixteen-week-old human infants distinguish optical displacements given by their own motion from displacements given by moving objects, and they use only the latter to perceive the unity of partly occluded objects. Optical changes produced by moving the observer around a stationary object produced attentional levels characteristic of stationary observers viewing stationary displays and much lower than those shown by stationary observers viewing moving displays. Real displacements of an object with no subject-relative displacement, produced by moving an object so as to maintain a constant relation to the moving observer, evoked attentional levels that were higher than with stationary displays and more characteristic of attention to moving displays, a finding suggesting detection of the real motion. Previously reported abilities of infants to perceive the unity of partly occluded objects from motion information were found to depend on real object motion rather than on optical displacements in general. The results suggest that object perception depends on registration of the motions of surfaces in the three-dimensional layout.     

Yes, we still need Universal Grammar

In a recent paper [Lidz, J., Gleitman, H., & Gleitman, L. (2003). Understanding how input matters: Verb learning and the footprint of universal grammar. Cognition, 87, 151-178], we provided cross-linguistic evidence in favor of the following linked assertions: (i) Verb argument structure is a correlate of verb meaning; (ii) However, argument structure is not directly available to learners as a cue for reconstructing verb meaning, owing to the complexity of form-meaning mappings within and across languages; (iii) A major correlate of argument-structure, namely, noun phrase number, is statistically available on the surface in all languages, and serves as a quasi-universal derivative cue to the meanings of verbs; (iv) this cue is privileged, in the sense that it is used early and selectively by learners, despite within- and cross-language differences in its availability. Goldberg [Goldberg, A. (2004). But do we need Universal Grammar? Comment on Lidz, Gleitman and Gleitman 2003. Cognition] suggests that this cue is not linguistic, that it is too sicklied o'er with exceptions and provisos to be useful to learners, and that conversational conspiracies can in any case serve as the alternative theoretical framework for a theory of predicate learning, and language acquisition more generally. In the present reply, we review and further explicate our original position, to wit: A large part of any generative grammar is a formal statement of the complex alignments between predicate-argument structures and the surface forms (linear strings of words) of sentences. Because the several rules for alignment interact, the surface outcomes reveal individual systematicities only abstractly. Therefore, learning would be impossible if infants could not analyze probabilistically available patterns to recover their principled linguistic sources. This statistics-based discovery procedure is in certain relevant regards specific to language learning. Finally, we argue that while pragmatics and theory of mind properties in learner and tutor necessarily frame language acquisition, that these have not been shown—and probably cannot be shown—to be sufficient to this computational problem.