Picture naming.

Picture naming has become an important experimental paradigm in cognitive psychology. To name a picture can be considered an elementary process in the use of language. Thus, its chronometric analysis elucidates cognitive structures and processes that underlie speaking. Essentially, these analyses compare picture naming with reading, picture categorizing, and word categorizing. Furthermore, techniques of double stimulation such as the paradigms of priming and of Stroop-like interference are used. In this article, recent results obtained with these methods are reviewed and discussed with regard to five hypotheses about the cognitive structures that are involved in picture naming. Beside the older hypotheses of internal coding systems with only verbal or only pictorial format, the hypotheses of an internal dual code with a pictorial and a verbal component, of a common abstract code with logogen and pictogen subsystems, and the so-called lexical hypothesis are discussed. The latter postulates two main components: an abstract semantic memory which, nevertheless, also subserves picture processing, and a lexicon that carries out the huge amount of word processing without semantic interpretation that is necessary in hearing, reading, speaking and writing.     

Context effects in stroop-like word and picture processing

Presents a series of 6 experiments in which Stroop-like effects were generated by modally pure color-color, picture-picture, and word-word stimuli instead of the usual modally mixed color-word or picture-word stimuli. Naming, reading, and categorization tasks were applied. The Stroop inhibition was preserved with these stimuli but unexpectedly showed a semantic gradient only in the naming and not in the reading task. Word categorizing was slower and more interference prone than picture categorizing. These and other results can be captured by a model with two main assumptions: (a) semantic memory and the lexicon are separate, and (b) words have privileged access to the lexicon, whereas pictures and colors have privileged access to the semantic network. Such a model is developed and put to an initial test.     

Initial experiences with cognitive therapy of schizophrenic patients

Based on earlier experiences of various groups of authors, we developed and modified a programme of cognitive therapy for schizophrenic patients. The aim of the application of the therapeutic programme to subacute patients was to decrease subjectively perceptible basic disorders and to improve the functions of performance. The present results and experiences with 4 groups consisting of a total of 31 patients encourage us to continue applying cognitive procedures of therapy. Problems of the ascertainment of measuring values and fundamental questions of therapeutic efficacy are discussed.     

Depressive symptoms and lymphocyte proliferation in older adults

In an 18-month prospective study, community-dwelling older adults, including both spousal caregivers of dementia patients and noncaregiving controls, were examined. Participants were selected on the basis of the presence or absence of chronic depressive symptoms that exceeded a cutoff score for clinically relevant depressive symptoms on a self-report symptom measure. Compared with nondepressed older adults, those with chronic, mild depressive symptoms had poorer T cell responses to 2 mitogens from baseline to follow-up. Additionally, among individuals with depressive symptoms, older age was associated with the poorest blastogenic response to the mitogens at follow-up. These findings extend the association between depression and immune function to community-dwelling older adults with chronic, mild depressive symptoms.     

When fair is foul and foul is fair: reverse priming in automatic evaluation.

Responses to information were facilitated by the rapid prior presentation of evaluatively congruent material. This fundamental discovery (R. H. Fazio, D. M. Sanbonmatsu, M. C. Powell, & F. R. Kardes, 1986) marked a breakthrough in research on automatic information processing by demonstrating that evaluative meaning is grasped without conscious control. Experiments employing a word naming task provided stringent tests of the automaticity of evaluation and found support for it. More strikingly, a previously unobserved reversal of these effects (i.e., slower responses to evaluatively matched rather than mismatched items) was found when primes were evaluatively extreme. Procedural variances across 6 experiments revealed that the reverse priming effect was highly robust. This discovery is analogous to demonstrations of contrast effects in controlled judgments. It is theorized that the reverse priming effect reflects an automatic correction for the biasing influence of the prime.     

Comparison of the distortion of probability information in decision under risk and an equivalent visual task

Decision makers typically overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. However, there are recent reports that when probability is presented in the form of relative frequencies, this typical pattern reverses. We tested this hypothesis by comparing decision making in two tasks: In one task, probability was stated numerically, and in the other task, it was conveyed through a visual representation. In the visual task, participants chose whether a "stochastic bullet" should be fired at either a large target for a small reward or a small target for a large reward. Participants' knowledge of probability in the visual task was the result of extensive practice firing bullets at targets. In the classical numerical task, participants chose between pairs of lotteries with probabilities and rewards matched to the probabilities and rewards in the visual task. We found that participants' probability-weighting functions were significantly different in the two tasks, but the pattern for the visual task was the typical, not the reversed, pattern.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.