The rapid-smoking technique: Subject characteristics and treatment outcome

There is a lack of consistency in findings regarding subject (S) characteristics and the effects of smoking-control programmes. Research workers appear to assume that abstinence and reduction in smoking rate are merely different points in the same continuum, and therefore seek to correlate S variables with percentage reductions in smoking rate. It is argued that abstinence and reduced smoking are more appropriately viewed as potentially discrete outcomes. Conceptualizing outcome in this manner, a discriminant function analysis was employed to determine whether it is possible to differentiate between Ss who do, or do not, abstain following participation in a treatment programme involving rapid-smoking. It was found that it is possible to discriminate between the two groups of Ss. Advantages deriving from this approach to the investigation of S characteristics and treatment outcome are discussed.     

Immunity to functional fixedness in young children

In thecandle problem (Duncker, 1945), subjects must attach a candle to a vertical surface, using only a box of tacks and a book of matches. Subjects exhibitfunctional fixedness by failing, or being slow, to make use of one object (the tack box) as a support, rather than as a container, in their solutions. This failure to produce alternate functions is measured against improved performance when the tack box is presented empty rather than full of tacks (i.e., not preutilized as a container). Using an analogous task, we show that functional fixedness can be demonstrated in older children (6- and 7-year-olds); they are significantly slower to use a box as a support when its containment function has been demonstrated than when it has not. However, younger children (5-year-olds) are immune to this effect, showing no advantage when the standard function is not demonstrated. Moreover, their performance under conditions of preutilization is better than that of both older groups. These results are interpreted in terms of children’s developing intuitions about function and the effects of past experience on problem solving.     

Functional fixedness in a technologically sparse culture

Problem solving can be inefficient when the solution requires subjects to generate an atypical function for an object and the object's typical function has been primed. Subjects become "fixed" on the design function of the object, and problem solving suffers relative to control conditions in which the object's function is not demonstrated. In the current study, such functional fixedness was demonstrated in a sample of adolescents (mean age of 16 years) among the Shuar of Ecuadorian Amazonia, whose technologically sparse culture provides limited access to large numbers of artifacts with highly specialized functions. This result suggests that design function may universally be the core property of artifact concepts in human semantic memory.     

Core mechanisms in "theory of mind"

Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The "theory of mind" mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief-desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process of selection by inhibition. This selection process (SP) develops slowly through the preschool period and well beyond. By modeling the ToMM-SP as mechanisms of selective attention, we have uncovered new empirical phenomena. We propose that early "theory of mind" is a modular-heuristic process of domain-specific learning.     

Biases in affective forecasting and recall in individuals with depression and anxiety symptoms

The authors used experience sampling to investigate biases in affective forecasting and recall in individuals with varying levels of depression and anxiety symptoms. Participants who were higher in depression symptoms demonstrated stronger (more pessimistic) negative mood prediction biases, marginally stronger negative mood recall biases, and weaker (less optimistic) positive mood prediction and recall biases. Participants who were higher in anxiety symptoms demonstrated stronger negative mood prediction biases, but positive mood prediction biases that were on par with those who were lower in anxiety. Anxiety symptoms were not associated with mood recall biases. Neither depression symptoms nor anxiety symptoms were associated with bias in event prediction. Their findings fit well with the tripartite model of depression and anxiety. Results are also consistent with the conceptualization of anxiety as a "forward-looking" disorder, and with theories that emphasize the importance of pessimism and general negative information processing in depressive functioning.     

A unique role of endogenous visual-spatial attention in rapid processing of multiple targets

Visual spatial attention can be exogenously captured by a salient stimulus or can be endogenously allocated by voluntary effort. Whether these two attention modes serve distinctive functions is debated, but for processing of single targets the literature suggests superiority of exogenous attention (it is faster acting and serves more functions). We report that endogenous attention uniquely contributes to processing of multiple targets. For speeded visual discrimination, response times are faster for multiple redundant targets than for single targets because of probability summation and/or signal integration. This redundancy gain was unaffected when attention was exogenously diverted from the targets but was completely eliminated when attention was endogenously diverted. This was not a result of weaker manipulation of exogenous attention because our exogenous and endogenous cues similarly affected overall response times. Thus, whereas exogenous attention is superior for processing single targets, endogenous attention plays a unique role in allocating resources crucial for rapid concurrent processing of multiple targets.     

V. Bibikhin’s practical phenomenology

This article is devoted to understanding the worldview expressed in Vladimir Bibikhin’s Leo Tolstoy’s Diaries. The most important feature of this worldview is its practical nature: Bibikhin focuses on changing one’s view of things instead of trying to develop a doctrine. Practical phenomenology is extremely vulnerable to criticism because of its pre-philosophical nature. Therefore, at this stage, I try to explicate some of the features of this peculiar thought while avoiding trying to find its faults. I draw a connection between Bibikhin’s ontological interpretation of the phenomenon with Heidegger’s concept of detachment (Gelassenheit) as a form of behavior, and illustrate that practical phenomenology turns out to be an ontology of contact. It thematizes the philosopher’s own being and focuses on the problems of the contact made in the “change of view,” in which thought, word, and deed converge. Bibikhin’s practical phenomenology is on the outskirts of modern academic philosophy, gravitating towards understanding philosophy as a way of life, in which the contemplative attitude takes the leading place, paradoxically combining experiment with their perception of “first things,” trust in them, and the ability to describe the indescribable, the “change of view.” This makes practical phenomenology related to the experimental phenomenology of Michel Henry.

     

A reaction time advantage for calculating beliefs over public representations signals domain specificity for ‘theory of mind’

In a task where participants’ overt task was to track the location of an object across a sequence of events, reaction times to unpredictable probes requiring an inference about a social agent’s beliefs about the location of that object were obtained. Reaction times to false belief situations were faster than responses about the (false) contents of a map showing the location of the object (Experiment 1) and about the (false) direction of an arrow signaling the location of the object (Experiment 2). These results are consistent with developmental, neuro-imaging and neuropsychological evidence that there exist domain specific mechanisms within human cognition for encoding and reasoning about mental states. Specialization of these mechanisms may arise from either core cognitive architecture or via the accumulation of expertise in the social domain.