Context specificity of latent inhibition in taste aversion learning

In three experiments rats were given injections of LiCl after consuming distinctively flavoured water. The rats developed an aversion to the flavour and in all experiments the magnitude of the aversion was found to be reduced in subjects that had received pre-exposure to the flavour without aversive consequences. Experiment 1 demonstrated this pre-exposure effect to be a case of latent inhibition. The remaining experiments investigated the effects of pre-exposing the flavour in a context different from that used for conditioning. It was found (Experiment 2) diat latent inhibition transferred perfectly when the context change consisted of a move from one home cage to another. Context specificity of latent inhibition was found (Experiment 3) only when the subjects were given daily sessions in die experimental contexts, these being cages different from the home cage.     

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

Life strains,coping, and emotional well-being: A longitudinal study of recently separated and married women

The stress and coping paradigm was used as the framework for a longitudinal study of recently separated and married women. Data were gathered at three different interviews over a period of 18 months. Comparing the two groups of women, it was found that life strains in the areas of financial concerns and spouse relations were related to both income level and marital status, with low-income and separated women experiencing the highest levels of these strains. Also, the separated women used coping strategies emphasizing personal change and reported more positive changes related to their family, work, and material conditions. Regression analyses on the entire sample showed that life strains were inversely related to emotional well-being and that coping served a stress-buffering function. It was concluded that the emotional well-being of separated and married women must be considered in the context of stress, coping, and change processes.     

Origins of the misplaced confidence effect in collaborative recall

Studies have shown that dyads and groups place significantly more confidence in wrong answers to questions about a jointly witnessed event than do individuals. This experiment was designed to discover whether this misplaced confidence is influenced by prior free collaborative recall of the events in question. The results clearly indicated that prior group remembering lessens the effect, and improves the testimonial validity of both individual and group answers to questions about a jointly witnessed event. Taken in conjunction with other studies, the results imply that two or more witnesses of an event may profitably discuss what happened, but that they may best be interrogated separately in order to maximize the information available to the interrogator and to minimize misplaced confidence.     

How much is an icon worth?

We report a new technique for assessing the amount of information extracted from the icon that follows a briefly presented picture. The problem of how to measure such information was formulated in terms of how much physical exposure of a picture an icon is worth. Consider two types of stimulus presentations, each with a base duration of d ms. The first is a d-ms picture followed by an icon, and the second is a d + a-ms picture not followed by an icon. How large does a have to be so that equivalent amounts of information are extracted in the two cases? To answer this question, we showed people pictures and later tested their memory for the pictures. We found that the physical exposure duration needed to reach a particular level of performance was approximately 100 ms longer when an icon was not permitted versus when the icon was permitted. This value was independent of the base duration and the luminance of the picture. Moreover, the same value was obtained using three different kinds of memory test and four different sets of pictures. We conclude that an icon is worth approximately 100 ms of additional physical exposure duration. A reasonable explanation for this robust equivalence between icon and stimulus is that the same encoding processes are responsible for extracting information from the icon and from the physical stimulus. Therefore, any variable that affects these encoding processes must affect extraction of information from the icon and the physical stimulus in an identical manner. This prediction was confirmed for one such variable, picture luminance.     

Anger and irrational thought: Questionnaire and interview ratings

From an initial pool of 96 students, 36 subjects were selected based on Novaco Anger Scale scores to form high-, moderate-, and low-anger groups (n=12). They completed self-report questionnaires and participated in a structured interview designed to elicit cognitive and affective responses to hypothetical situations involving interpersonal conflict. High- and moderate-anger groups scored significantly higher than low-anger subjects on a questionnaire measure of irrational thinking. High-anger subjects scored higher than low-anger subjects on general anxiety, suspiciousness, fear of negative evaluation, hostility, and criticism of themselves and others. Interview ratings showed that there were no group differences in self-reports of anger or ability to cope with conflict, yet raters judged high-anger subjects to display more anger than low-anger subjects in their stated response actions. Estimates of coping ability varied inversely with reports of anger experienced. Generally, results support a relationship between irrational thinking patterns and anger in feeling and action. Implications for treatment are discussed.     

Time went by so slowly: Overestimation of event duration by males and females

In three experiments, 469 subjects watched a short videotape of a bank robbery and later estimated the duration of the tape. Subjects invariably overestimated the durations. Accuracy of time estimation was unrelated to amount of free recall (Experiment 1) or accuracy of memory (Experiment 2). Females overestimated to a greater degree than males (Experiments 2 and 3). A more stressful version of the event produced greater overestimates than a less stressful version (Experiment 3). The relationship between induced arousal and time estimation appears to be different for men and women.