If it changes it must be a process: study of emotion and coping during three stages of a college examination

This natural experiment provides substantial evidence for the following major themes, which are based on a cognitively oriented, process-centered theory of stress and coping: First, a stressful encounter should be viewed as a dynamic, unfolding process, not as a static, unitary event. Emotion and coping (including the use of social support) were assessed at three stages of a midterm examination: the anticipation stage before the exam, the waiting stage after the exam and before grades were announced, and after grades were posted. For the group as a whole there were significant changes in emotions and coping (including the use of social support) across the three stages. Second, people experience seemingly contradictory emotions and states of mind during every stage of an encounter. In this study, for example, subjects experienced both threat emotions and challege emotions. The complexity of emotions and their cognitive appraisals reflects ambiguity regarding the multifaceted nature of the exam and its meanings, especially during the anticipation stage. Third, coping is a complex process. On the average, subjects used combinations of most of the available forms of problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping at every stage of the exam. Different forms of coping were salient during the anticipation and waiting stages. Problem-focused coping and emphasizing the positive were more prominent during the former, and distancing more prominent during the latter. Finally, despite normatively shared emotional reactions at each stage, substantial individual differences remained. Using selected appraisal and coping variables, and taking grade point averages (GPA) into account, approximately 48% of the variances in threat and challenge emotions at the anticipation stage was explained. Controlling for variance due to the grade received, appraisal, and coping variables accounted for 28% of the variance in positive and negative emotions at the outcome stage. Including grade, 57% of the variance in positive emotions at outcome and 61% of the negative emotions at outcome were explained.     

Unit Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration—An Israeli Example1

The concept of morale, within its military context, was explored in the present work from both its theoretical and practical aspects. Following a review of the concept's definitional and historical background, the data from a pre-war morale survey administered in May of 1981 to a large sample of Israeli combat troops were analyzed (by means of intercorrelations and factor analysis) as an illustration of the multifaceted structure of morale. While the intercorrelations revealed several major variables related strongly to morale, the factor analysis yielded eight factors, morale being just one of them. These eight factors were: (1) confidence in senior commanders; (2) confidence in one's self, team, and weapons; (3) unit cohesion and morale; (4) familiarity with missions and frontage; (5) confidence in immediate commanders; (6) enemy evaluation; (7) legitimacy of war; (8) worries and concerns. The present analysis may suggest the existence of a higher order concept—perhaps “unit climate”— of which all of the found factors, including morale, are the comprising components.     

Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion

The 2 main tasks of this article are 1st, to examine what a theory of emotion must do and basic issues that it must address. These include definitional issues, whether or not physiological activity should be a defining attribute, categorical versus dimensional strategies, the reconciliation of biological universals with sociocultural sources of variability, and a classification of the emotions. The 2nd main task is to apply an analysis of appraisal patterns and the core relational themes that they produce to a number of commonly identified emotions. Anger, anxiety, sadness, and pride (to include 1 positive emotion) are used as illustrations. The purpose is to show the capability of a cognitive-motivational-relational theory to explain and predict the emotions. The role of coping in emotion is also discussed, and the article ends with a response to criticisms of a phenomenological, folk-theory outlook.     

Subjectifying the Personality State: Theoretical Underpinnings and an Empirical Example

Recent developments in personality research highlight the value of modelling dynamic state-like manifestations of personality. The present work integrates these developments with prominent clinical models addressing within-person multiplicity and promotes the exploration of models centred on state-like manifestations of personality that function as cohesive organizational units. Such units possess distinct subjective qualities and are characterized by specific affects, behaviours, cognitions, and desires that tend to be co-activated. As background, we review both theory and research from the fields of social cognition, psychotherapy, and psychopathology that serve as the foundation for such models. We then illustrate our ideas in greater detail with one well-supported clinical model—the schema therapy mode model, chosen because it provides a finite and definite set of modes (i.e. cohesive personality states). We assessed these modes using a newly developed experience-sampling measure administered to 52 individuals (four times daily for 15 days). We estimated intraindividual and group-level temporal and contemporaneous networks based on the within-person variance as well as between-person network. We discuss findings from exemplar participants and from group-level networks and address cross-model particularities and consistencies. In conclusion, we consider potential idiographic and nomothetic applications of subjective states dynamic personality research based on intensive longitudinal methods. © 2020 European Association of Personality Psychology     

“Love is only between living beings who are equal in power”: On what is alive (and what is dead) in Hegel's account of marriage

The paper develops a conception of marital love as a complex recognitive relation, which I articulate by juxtaposing it against other recognitive relations that figure in Hegel's theory of modern civil society (i.e., respect and esteem). Drawing on Hegel's early writings, I argue that, if love is to provide its unique sort of recognition, it must obtain between “living beings who are equal in power”—a peculiar form of equality that I name (drawing on Stanley Cavell's work) “dynamic equality.” I conclude that it is by Hegel's own lights that we should reject his notorious conception of the sexual difference. However, I also offer reasons why, from Hegel's early 19th century perspective, he could consider the following two conditions as compatible: (1) equality within marriage and (2) sexual hierarchy outside marriage, namely, in civil society.