Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

SETTING CUTOFF SCORES: LEGAL, PSYCHOMETRIC, AND PROFESSIONAL ISSUES AND GUIDELINES

Cutoff scores are used in a variety of settings to help managers make personnel decisions. Although cutoff scores are used widely, information about their derivation and appropriate use is scattered in the legal, psychometric, and professional literatures. The purpose of this paper is to analyze critically and to integrate these diverse literatures, to summarize what is known and what is unknown about the use and misuse of cutoff scores. Alternative methods are examined in relation to legal precedents set by the courts, to psychometric principles, and to the various sets of professional guidelines. Directions for future research are suggested, and we conclude with a set of recommendations regarding acceptable professional practice in this area.     

ISSUES CONCERNING THE USE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS IN SALARY DISCRIMINATION CASES

Twenty-nine salary discrimination court cases were examined to determine ways an organization can refute a regression analysis that leads to the inference of discrimination in compensation. It was found to be equally effective for the organization to introduce its own regression, other statistics, or no statistics. The plaintiff won all of the cases when discrimination was proven in promotion. The defendant won all cases when discrimination was not proven in promotion. Defendants also won all cases when plaintiffs inappropriately treated jobs as fungible or when they failed to include important variables. Market variables may be included in regressions if defendants can show they were applied consistently to determine salaries. The implications of the courts' acceptance of some regressions for comparable worth is presented, and a list of recommendations is made for organizations that may be faced with results from regression analysis in court.     

Employee Assistance Programs: A Systemic Investigation of Their Use

Braun, A.L., & Novak, D.E. (1986, November/December). A study of EAP non-utilization. EAP Digest, pp. 52–55. O'Connell, V. (1987, March/April). A strategy for overcoming supervisors' resistance. EAP Digest, pp. 63–66. Penzer, W.N. (1987, March/April). Toward sustaining quality mental health services. EAP Digest, pp. 35–40.     

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND TERMINATIONS: A REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS SINCE BRITO V. ZIA WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL PRACTICES

Court cases since the classic Brito v. Zia (1973) decision dealing with terminations based on subjective performance appraisals are reviewed. Professional interpretations of Brito v. Zia are also examined and criticized in light of professional practice and subsequent court decisions. Major themes and issues are distilled from the review of cases, and implications and recommendations for personnel practices were discussed.     

THE BIASING EFFECTS OF SUBORDINATE LIKEABLENESS ON LEADERS' RESPONSES TO POOR PERFORMERS: A LABORATORY AND A FIELD STUDY

A laboratory and a field study investigated the biasing effects of subordinate likableness on leaders' attributions for subordinate poor performance and their corrective actions toward subordinates. In the laboratory study, 96 undergraduate students served as leaders and were presented with a vignette describing an incident of poor performance committed by either a liked or a disliked subordinate. Leaders made attributions for the poor performance and then rated the appropriateness of a series of corrective actions. Analyses revealed that leaders made similar attributions for the poor performance of liked and disliked subordinates, but were more inclined to punish a disliked subordinate than a liked subordinate. A second study replicated these findings with 98 leaders in an actual organization. Implications of the results for disciplinary policies are discussed.