The Universal Declaration’s Problematic Rights Justification

Abstract

In this paper I aim to critically analyse the underlying moral justification of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth. The aim of the critique is to highlight some of the problematic areas that underpin the Declaration’s rights and in doing so to point to ways that one can begin to rectify the problems with them and the Universal Declaration itself. The paper aims to critically examine the moral justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, which is found in the works of Thomas Berry and his commentators who use the notion of ‘subjectivity’ to justify the existence of such rights. The paper critically examines such a notion and argues that it is not strong enough to do the work required of it, and that it is too problematic to serve as a justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, as the ethical framework it provides is too cryptic and indeterminate, and does not provide us with an adequate action- and law-guiding framework upon which to establish the Universal Declaration and its rights.     

One Man's Authenticity is Another Man's Betrayal: A Reply to Levy

This article responds to Neil Levy's recent suggestion that: (1) the use of pharmaceutical enhancers can be understood as promoting our authenticity, no matter which of the two main contemporary conceptions of authenticity we adopt; and that (2) we do not need to decide between these two rival models (the ‘self‐discovery’ and the ‘self‐creation’ conception) in order to assess the common worry that enhancements will undermine our authenticity. Levy's core argument is based on a comparison between cases of people with ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ (GID) seeking sex reassignment surgery, and cases of enhancement via pharmaceuticals. While conceding the plausibility of Levy's claim (1), I offer reasons to resist (2), by pointing out structural differences between GID cases and some paradigmatic cases of pharmacological enhancement. I argue that these differences prevent the latter sort of cases from counting as authenticity‐promoting on the self‐discovery view. I conclude that Levy's proposed way of ‘breaking the stalemate’ in this debate is unsuccessful: we cannot avoid settling the dispute between the two models if we are to adequately address the authenticity worry about pharmacological enhancement.