Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?

A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.     

Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.     

Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.     

American Indian methamphetamine and other drug use in the Southwestern United States

To investigate the extent of methamphetamine and other drug use among American Indians (AIs) in the Four Corners region, we developed collaborations with Southwestern tribal entities and treatment programs in and around New Mexico. We held nine focus groups, mostly with Southwestern AI participants (N = 81) from three diverse New Mexico communities to understand community members, treatment providers, and clients/relatives views on methamphetamine. We conducted a telephone survey of staff (N = 100) from agencies across New Mexico to assess perceptions of methamphetamine use among people working with AI populations. We collected and analyzed self-reported drug use data from 300 AI clients/relatives who completed the Addiction Severity Index (ASI) in the context of treatment at three diverse addiction treatment programs. Each focus group offered a unique perspective about the effect of drugs and alcohol on each respective community. Though data from the phone surveys and ASIs suggested concerning rates of methamphetamine use, with women more adversely affected by substance use in general, alcohol was identified as the biggest substance use problem for AI populations in the Southwest. There appears to be agreement that methamphetamine use is a significant problem in these communities, but that alcohol is much more prevalent and problematic. There was less agreement about what should be done to prevent and treat methamphetamine use. Future research should attend to regional and tribal differences due to variability in drug use patterns, and should focus on identifying and improving dissemination of effective substance use interventions.     

Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better

Agent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, however, that the commitments of agent-relative consequentialism lead it to run afoul of a plausibility requirement on moral theories. A moral theory must not be such that, in any possible circumstance, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more reason (by the lights of the very same theory) to prefer the world thereby actualized over the world that would have been actualized if every agent had instead acted permissibly.     

Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding

Philosophical Studies - How should we understand the relationship between binary belief and degree of belief? To answer this question, we should look to desire. Whatever relationship we think holds...     

Motivational enhancement therapy for African American substance users: a randomized clinical trial

Limited empirical evidence concerning the efficacy of substance abuse treatments among African Americans reduces opportunities to evaluate and improve program efficacy. The current study, conducted as a secondary analysis of a randomized clinical trial conducted by the Clinical Trials Network of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, addressed this knowledge gap by examining the efficacy of motivational enhancement therapy (MET) compared with counseling as usual (CAU) among 194 African American adults seeking outpatient substance abuse treatment at 5 participating sites. The findings revealed higher retention rates among women in MET than in CAU during the initial 12 weeks of the 16-week study. Men in MET and CAU did not differ in retention. However, MET participants self-reported more drug-using days per week than participants in CAU. Implications for future substance abuse treatment research with African Americans are discussed.     

A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism

In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non‐analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non‐analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire‐based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire‐based account of practical reasons is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the reduction fails.     

Actualism Doesn’t Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman

Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism.