Development of the appearance-reality distinction

Young children can express conceptual difficulties with the appearance-reality distinction in two different ways: (1) by incorrectly reporting appearance when asked to report reality (“phenomenism”); (2) by incorrectly reporting reality when asked to report appearance (“intellectual realism”). Although both phenomenism errors and intellectual realism errors have been observed in previous studies of young children's cognition, the two have not been seen as conceptually related and only the former errors have been taken as a symptom of difficulties with the appearance-reality distinction. Three experiments investigated 3- to 5-year-old children's ability to distinguish between and correctly identify real versus apparent object properties (color, size, and shape), object identities, object presence-absence, and action identities. Even the 3-year-olds appeared to have some ability to make correct appearance-reality discriminations and this ability increased with age. Errors were frequent, however, and almost all children who erred made both kinds. Phenomenism errors predominated on tasks where the appearance versus reality of the three object properties were in question; intellectual realism errors predominated on the other three types of tasks. Possible reasons for this curious error pattern were advanced. It was also suggested that young children's problems with the appearance-reality distinction may be partly due to a specific metacognitive limitation, namely, a difficulty in analyzing the nature and source of their own mental representations.     

The development of retrieval strategies in young children

Two incidental memory tasks were given to 3.5–6.5 yr old children to test for an age increase in the tendency to use a simple indirect retrieval strategy when direct retrieval efforts do not suffice. In both tasks, pictures of people were paired with very closely associated toy objects (e.g., farmer—toy tractor), and the indirect retrieval strategy consisted of thinking to use one member of the pair as a cue to the recall of the other, e.g., turning over the visible but facedown pictures and using them as retrieval cues for the toys. Support for the predicted age trend was obtained in one of the two tasks. It was suggested that the development of retrieval skills in children may show some parallels with that of storage skills.     

Developmental changes in apportionment of study time among items in a multitrial free recall task

First grade, third grade, and college Ss attempted to memorize a single set of items over the course of 5 trials, each trial consisting of a 45-sec study period followed by a free recall test. On all trials but the first, S was allowed to have available during his study period only half of the total set of items, but was free to select whichever items he wished to include in this half. Third grade and college Ss were significantly more prone than first grade Ss to select for study items not recalled in the immediately preceding recall test. The results suggest that the strategy of deliberately concentrating one's study activities on the less well mastered segments of materials to be learned, like other elementary memory strategies (e.g., rote rehearsal), cannot automatically be assumed to be part of a young child's repertoire of learning techniques.     

What young children think you see when their eyes are closed

The common assumption that young children egocentrically believe you cannot see them when their own eyes are closed was investigated in two studies. It was found that 2.5-4-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds and adults, would indeed often give negative reply to the experimenter's question “Do I see you?” when their eyes were closed and covered with their hands. However, they would also correctly reply that the experimenter did see their arm and an object placed in front of them and did not see their eyes and back, indicating that they were making veridical, nonegocentric inferences about the experimenter's visual experience. In addition, their eyes being visible to the experimenter did not prove to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for their judgment that the experimenter could see “them” (“you”). It was concluded that, in this context, adults take “you” to mean their whole body while young children take it to mean primarily their face region. Speculations were made as to how young children could have acquired this meaning, and about possible similarities and differences between the self conceptions of young children and adults.     

The Development of Children's Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction

Recent research has shown parallels between the development of young children's understanding of false belief and their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. First, both develop between 3 and 4–5 years of age and develop concurrently in individual children. Second, the younger children's difficulties with both concepts seem genuine and deep-seated. Finally, these difficulties are general, in the sense of being evident in a variety of types of beliefs and appearances. Most researchers in this area believe that these developments are mediated by an emerging representational conception of the mind.     

A Developmental Study of Judgments of Semantic Similarity

Inhelder and Piaget offer a single protocol as their only evidence that a fully developed formal operational thinker uses all 16 binary operations of truth-functional logic. The investigators attempted to replicate the Inhelder-Piaget results with a random sample of 57 subjects (18 9-year-olds, 19 12-year-olds, 20 16-year-olds). Not one of the subjects used more than five of the 16 operations, and there was no developmental trend with regard to the number of operations used (X² = .4917, p > .05). A trend was manifest, however, since the more developed reasoner used the same operations as the less developed reasoner, but in a more complex and sophisticated manner.     

Development of children's understanding of connections between thinking and feeling

Two studies assessed the development of children's understanding that thoughts and feelings are closely interlinked. These studies showed that, unlike 8-year-olds and adults, 5-year-olds seldom explained a sudden change in emotion that had no apparent external cause by appeal to the occurrence of a thought. They also tended not to recognize that a person who is feeling sad is probably also thinking sad thoughts, or that people may be able to make themselves feel happy just by thinking of something happy. These results are consistent with evidence that young children tend to be unaware of the stream of consciousness and have poor introspective skills. A possible developmental sequence leading to an understanding of these thought-feeling links is proposed.