Objects with a past: Husserl on “ad-memorizing apperceptions”

In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of ??apperception?? should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically ??indicated?? with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions ??appresenting?? a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to ??ad-memorized?? (hinzuerinnert, ad-memoriert) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of ??apperceptions,?? this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms.     

Der Begriff der „Bekundung“ bei Husserl und Heidegger

The article intends to explore the extension of several Husserlian concepts and issues in Heidegger’s first lectures of the 1920s. To this extent it focuses especially on the concept of Bekundung (intimation), exposed by Husserl in the second book of his Ideas, and also discussed by Heidegger in his Freiburg lecture Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (WS 1919/20). By following this concept both in Husserl’s theory of the constitution of materiality and causal reality, as well as in his discussion of the personal self, and by pointing out the tensions between the two perspectives, we will try to show that Heidegger’s use of the term can in several aspects be seen as an attempt to solve certain difficulties of the Husserlian perspective. Thus, we wish to sketch out a part of that complex network of continuities and differences that constitute the “common ground” of the two thinkers in the early 1920s.     

Zur geschichtlichen Wende der genetischen Phänomenologie. Eine Interpretation der Beilage III der <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis>

The paper addresses the methodological tensions between Husserl’s phenomenology and history by reinterpreting the Addendum III of the Krisis-work in view of genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts out by retracing the traditional criticism against the unhistorical character of Husserl’s phenomenology as voiced by Heidegger, Adorno and others. Afterwards, it moves on to analyse the troubled relationship between static and genetic phenomenology, on the one hand, and between genetic phenomenology and empirical genesis, on the other hand. Finally, it arrives at a step by step methodological reconstruction of Husserl’s considerations on the “origin of geometry”, which are regarded to be an application of the methods of genetic phenomenology to the field of history.     

Gibt es perzeptive Phantasie? Als-ob-Bewusstsein,Widerstreit und Neutralität in Husserls Aufzeichnungen zur Bildbetrachtung

Unser Beitrag versucht eine systematische Auslegung des Begriffs der „perzeptiven Phantasie“, den Husserl in einigen Aufzeichnungen zum Bildbewusstsein anwendet. Dabei werden drei der wesentlichen Aspekte, die in der Husserl-Literatur das Thema Bild durchgehend bestimmen, einer gründlichen Analyse unterzogen: der Begriff des „Widerstreitbewusstseins“, die Idee der „Neutralit?t“ und die Scheidung zwischen Impression und Reproduktion. Jedes dieser Themen spielt eine wesentliche Rolle in der husserlschen Auslegung des Bildbewusstseins. Dabei sind aber alle diese Themen, wie wir zeigen wollen, letztlich von einem Einstellungsunterschied bestimmt, der im sp?teren Nachlass Husserls zwischen Erfahrung und Phantasie besteht. Ausgehend von Husserls Unterscheidung zweier Bedeutungsrichtungen des Begriffs „Phantasie“ – als „Reproduktion“ einerseits und als „Modus des Vollzugs“ andererseits – soll bewiesen werden, dass der Ausdruck „perzeptive Phantasie“ keineswegs den Beitrag von reproduktiven Akten zur Konstitution der Bildlichkeit betrifft, sondern eben die Tatsache, dass der Bildbetrachtung eine eigentümliche Einstellung, jene des „Als-ob“, entspricht.     

Eidetic intuition as physiognomics: rethinking Adorno’s phenomenological heritage

Continental Philosophy Review - Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements...