Extending a class of motion stimuli to study multiattribute texture perception

We present a class of stimuli that makes it possible to study the interaction of visual attributes in forming textural patterns. These stimuli are obtained in a simple manner from a class of motion stimuli that we described earlier (Papathomas & Gorea, 1988). The main advantages of the texture stimuli presented in this paper are: (1) each attribute can be arranged simultaneously with, but independently of, other attributes, (2) an arbitrary number of attributes can be used, (3) the interaction of attributes can be studied systematically, (4) direct comparison of two attributes is possible with stimuli in which the two are arranged to form competing patterns, and (5) because of the similarity to the motion stimuli, the relationship between texture and motion mechanisms can be investigated.     

“Wonderful but Weak”: Children’s Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Women

Sex Roles - According to ambivalent sexism theory, prejudice toward women has two forms: hostile (i.e., antipathy toward women) and benevolent (i.e., patronizing and paternalistic attitudes toward...     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

Individual cognitive style affects flood-risk perception and mitigation intentions

Risk perception of natural hazards has been widely studied as one of the potential determinants of people's behaviors and behavioral intentions. However, individual differences can also affect risk perception. The present work focused on the link between an individual cognitive mindset (i.e., level of holism) and flood-risk perception. It also assessed the consequences of such a link on public and personal mitigation intentions, taking into account the sense of connection with the environment, the psychological distance from the adverse event, and the role played by previous personal experience with flooding. Our study (N = 191) showed that the individual cognitive style predicted risk perceptions and personal (for both experienced and no-experience groups) and public (only for experienced group) mitigation intentions, through the mediation of the sense of connection with the environment and the psychological distance from the adverse event. Results are discussed in terms of their practical implications for public communication and policies about environmental hazards.     

Statistical learning of multiple speech streams: A challenge for monolingual infants

Language acquisition depends on the ability to detect and track the distributional properties of speech. Successful acquisition also necessitates detecting changes in those properties, which can occur when the learner encounters different speakers, topics, dialects, or languages. When encountering multiple speech streams with different underlying statistics but overlapping features, how do infants keep track of the properties of each speech stream separately? In four experiments, we tested whether 8‐month‐old monolingual infants (N = 144) can track the underlying statistics of two artificial speech streams that share a portion of their syllables. We first presented each stream individually. We then presented the two speech streams in sequence, without contextual cues signaling the different speech streams, and subsequently added pitch and accent cues to help learners track each stream separately. The results reveal that monolingual infants experience difficulty tracking the statistical regularities in two speech streams presented sequentially, even when provided with contextual cues intended to facilitate separation of the speech streams. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding how infants learn and separate the input when confronted with multiple statistical structures.     

Negative mood, self-focused attention, and the experience of physical symptoms: the joint impact hypothesis

A joint impact hypothesis on symptom experience is introduced that specifies the role of negative mood and self-focus, which have been considered independently in previous research. Accordingly, negative affect only promotes symptom experience when people simultaneously focus their attention on the self. One correlational study and 4 experiments supported this prediction: Only negative mood combined with self-focus facilitated the experience (see the self-reports in Studies 1, 2a, & 2b) and the accessibility (lexical decisions, Stroop task in Studies 3 & 4) of physical symptoms, whereas neither positive mood nor negative mood without self-focus did. Furthermore, the joint impact of negative mood and self-focused attention on momentary symptom experience remained significant after controlling for the influence of dispositional symptom reporting and neuroticism.     

Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience

The structure of autoreferential statements that describe (or serve as a logical model for) the human conscious experience is analyzed. Autoreferential statements are introduced by autoreferential definitions, such as a=F(a, x), where F is a Boolean function and x is some atomic statement describing the content of the experience, or by analogous systems of inter-related definitions, such as a=F(b, x, y) and b=G(a, x, z). It is argued that only "noncreative" (systems of) definitions introduce statements that describe conscious experience, the noncreativeness meaning that no statement with non-tautological content can be derived from these definitions. The structure of such (systems of) definitions is comprehensively characterized in a series of theorems. A potential of the model in addressing empirical data is illustrated by applying it to the choice between two alternatives in the absence of a preference criterion. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Processing of Grammatical Gender in a Three-Gender System: Experimental Evidence from Russian

Four experiments investigated the effect of grammatical gender on lexical access in Russian. Adjective–noun pairs were presented auditorily, using a cued-shadowing technique in which subjects must repeat the second word (the target noun), following adjectives that are either concordant or discordant with the noun's gender. Experiment 1 demonstrates gender priming with unambiguous adjectives and phonologically transparent masculine or feminine nouns. Experiment 2 examines priming for transparent nouns against a neutral baseline (possible only for feminines and neuters), revealing that priming is due primarily to inhibition from discordant gender. Experiment 3 demonstrates gender priming with phonologically opaque masculine and feminine nouns. Experiment 4 returns to transparent masculine and feminine nouns with a different kind of baseline, using three versions of a single word root (prost—simple, in the feminine adjectival form prostaja, masculine adjectival form prostoj, and the adverbial form prosto ), and shows that gender can also facilitate lexical access, at least for feminine nouns. We conclude that Russian listeners can exploit gender agreement cues on-line, helping them to predict the identity of an upcoming word.     

What Invariance Is and How to Test for It

Causal assessment is the problem of establishing whether a relation between (variable) X and (variable) Y is causal. This problem, to be sure, is widespread across the sciences. According to accredited positions in the philosophy of causality and in social science methodology, invariance under intervention provides the most reliable test to decide whether X causes Y. This account of invariance (under intervention) has been criticised, among other reasons, because it makes manipulations on the putative causal factor fundamental for the causal methodology; consequently, the argument goes, the account is ill-suited to those contexts where manipulations are not performed, for instance, the social sciences. The article aims to extend the account of invariance (under intervention), in a way that manipulations on the putative causal factors are not methodologically fundamental, and yet invariance remains key for causal assessment both in experimental and non-experimental contexts.