Team Semantics for Interventionist Counterfactuals: Observations vs. Interventions

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Team semantics is a highly general framework for logics which describe dependencies and independencies among variables. Typically, the (in)dependencies considered...     

Continuum between Relational and Therapeutic Models of Self-help in Mental Health: A Qualitative Approach

Self-help groups are generally described as “group[s] composed of individuals who meet on a regular basis to help one another cope with a life problem” (APA, 2019). Yet, it is challenging to find a univocal definition of self-help groups. Scholars usually use different labels to highlight various features of self-help groups, suggesting the need for further inquiry regarding commonalities and differences. The level of professional involvement is one of the most disputed factors influencing whether a group is considered to belong to the “self-help family.” The present qualitative study aimed to understand how professional support in Tuscany, Italy can influence the organizational choices of these groups (place for meetings, admission criteria, timing, etc.), as well as the personal beliefs of members. The study included 17 self-help groups. During 13 focus groups meetings, 92 participants were interviewed; then, we individually interviewed 19 facilitators and six additional key informants from mental health settings. We used a grounded theory approach, and we discussed the emerging models with participants at a public event. Results show the emergence of two theoretical models to define self-help groups, not to be interpreted as mutually exclusive. The “relational model” refers to self-help groups whose main feature is to guarantee the acquisition of specific skills (social comparison skills, active listening, and empathy), while the “therapeutic model” seems to represent a kind of assimilation of other types of interventions.     

Overcoming the acting/reasoning dualism in intelligent behavior

In a paper that recently appeared in this journal, we proposed a model that aims at providing a comprehensive account of our ability to intelligently use tools, bridging sensorimotor and reasoning-based explanations of this ability. Central to our model is the notion of generalized motor programs for tool use, which we defined as a synthesis between classic motor programs, as described in the scientific literature, and Peircean habits. In his commentary, Osiurak proposes a critique of the notion of generalized motor program, and suggests that the limitations of our model can be solved by integrating it with the view that motor programs are generated by a previous mechanical reasoning, independent from sensorimotor knowledge. Here we reply that while on the one hand our reference to Peircean habits gets over the temptation to consider motor programs as fixed internal entities, it also rejects the view, endorsed by Osiurak, that intelligent practice is a mixture of antecedent abstract reasoning and subsequent motor execution.     

Attention in athletes of high and low experience engaged in different open skill sports

In this study were examined differences in attentional style of athletes engaged in two open skill sports requiring high reactivity (karate and volleyball) in groups with high or low experience. 42 healthy men, 24 volleyball players, 12 of High Experience (first division Italian League players whose M age was 28 yr. (SD=5) and 12 of Low Experience (prejunior Italian team athletes whose M age was 19 yr. (SD= 2). and 18 karateka, 9 of High Experience (3rd and 4th dan black belt athletes whose M age was 31 yr., SD=5) and 9 of Low Experience (1st and 2nd dan black belt karateka whose M age was 32 yr., SD=5). Tests involved different types of attention: Alert, Go/No-Go, Divided Attention, and Working Memory. For each one, the reaction time (RT), variability, change in RT, and number of errors were analysed. Karateka of High Experience reacted faster than those of Low Experience on the simple RT test, Alert (M RT: 204 vs 237 msec., p< .01), while on the Divided Attention test, the High Experience subjects performed more poorly and committed more errors (M errors: 4.89 vs 1.44, p <.003). Young volleyball players of Low Experience reacted faster than colleagues of High Experience on the Alert (M RT: 187 vs 210 msec., p<.01) and Divided Attention tests (M RT: 590 vs 688 msec., p<.001) but committed more errors (Divided Attention test, M errors: 6.50 vs 3.08, p<.007). For the Divided Attention and Working Memory tests, correlations were positive among errors, RT, and RT variability but only for volleyball athletes of High Experience, suggesting they showed higher attention and stability in complex reactions than the group with Low Experience. No significant correlations were noted for either group of karateka on complex reactions. Results suggested that the attentional resources were engaged in different ways in the two groups of athletes and, in each group, there were differences between persons of High and Low Experience.     

Overcoming the emotion experience/expression dichotomy

We challenge the classic experience/expression dichotomous account of emotions, according to which experiencing and expressing an emotion are two independent processes. By endorsing Dewey's and Mead's accounts of emotions, and capitalizing upon recent empirical findings, we propose that expression is part of the emotional experience. This proposal partly challenges the purely constructivist approach endorsed by the authors of the target article.     

Types of abduction in tool behavior

Tool-use behavior is currently one of the most intriguing and widely debated topics in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts of our ability to use tools have been proposed. In the first part of the paper we review the most prominent interpretations and suggest that none of these accounts, considered in itself, is sufficient to explain tool use. In the second part of the paper we disentangle three different types of reasoning on tools, characterized by a different distribution of motor and cognitive ingredients. At the conceptual level, these types of reasoning reflect the distinction between three types of abductive inference as they are described in semiotic studies. At the functional level, we suggest that these types of reasoning on tools may correspond to different mental processes, possibly implemented in different regions of the left inferior parietal lobe. This proposal can account for the different interpretations commonly associated with the role of the left parietal cortex in tool use.     

Distinct and shared cognitive functions mediate event- and time-based prospective memory impairment in normal ageing

Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to perform an action at a specific point in the future. Regarded as multidimensional, PM involves several cognitive functions that are known to be impaired in normal ageing. In the present study we set out to investigate the cognitive correlates of PM impairment in normal ageing. Manipulating cognitive load, we assessed event- and time-based PM, as well as several cognitive functions, including executive functions, working memory, and retrospective episodic memory, in healthy participants covering the entire adulthood. We found that normal ageing was characterised by PM decline in all conditions and that event-based PM was more sensitive to the effects of ageing than time-based PM. Whatever the conditions, PM was linked to inhibition and processing speed. However, while event-based PM was mainly mediated by binding and retrospective memory processes, time-based PM was mainly related to inhibition. The only distinction between high- and low-load PM cognitive correlates lies in an additional, but marginal, correlation between updating and the high-load PM condition. The association of distinct cognitive functions, as well as shared mechanisms with event- and time-based PM, confirm that each type of PM relies on a different set of processes.