On the Relation Between Time Perception and the Timing of Motor Action: Evidence for a Temporal Oscillator Controlling the Timing of Movement

Studies of time estimation have provided evidence that human time perception is determined by an internal clock containing a temporal oscillator and have also provided estimates of the frequency of this oscillator (Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1992; Treisman & Brogan, 1992). These estimates were based on the observation that when the intervals to be estimated are accompanied by auditory clicks that recur at certain critical rates, perturbations in time estimation occur. To test the hypothesis that the mechanisms that underlie the perception of time and those that control the timing of motor performance are similar, analogous experiments were performed on motor timing, with the object of seeing whether evidence for a clock would be obtained and if so whether its properties resemble those of the time perception clock. The prediction was made that perturbations in motor timing would be seen at the same or similar critical auditory click rates. The experiments examined choice reaction time and typing. The results support the hypothesis that a temporal oscillator paces motor performance and that this oscillator is similar to the oscillator underlying time perception. They also provide an estimate of the characteristic frequency of the oscillator.     

Age differences in source forgetting: effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses.     

The internal clock: evidence for a temporal oscillator underlying time perception with some estimates of its characteristic frequency

Evidence for the proposition that human time perception is determined by an internal clock is largely indirect. It would strengthen the case for this hypothesis if a model for the internal clock were available from which predictions could be derived and tested, and if the basic parameter of such a model, the frequency at which the clock runs, could be estimated. A model for an internal temporal pacemaker is briefly described and its properties are explored by computer simulation. Results are obtained that provide a basis for predicting that, under appropriate conditions, interference between an imposed rhythm and the frequency of a temporal oscillator may cause perturbations in temporal judgment which are related to the characteristic frequency of that oscillator. Experimental data are reported which appear to demonstrate such an interference pattern. These results allow some estimates of the characteristic frequency of the temporal oscillator to be obtained.     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.     

The structure of executive functioning in 11 to 14 year olds with and without special educational needs

The structure and development of executive functioning (EF) have been intensively studied in typically developing populations, with little attention given to those with Special Educational Needs (SEN). This study addresses this by comparing the EF structure of 132 adolescents (11–14 years-old) with SEN and 138 adolescents not requiring additional support (Non-SEN peers). Participants completed verbal and non-verbal assessments of key components of EF: inhibition, working memory and switching. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on each group tested one-, two- and three-factor models of EF. In both groups, there was statistical support for the fit of one- and two-factor models with no model being clearly better than the others; there was little support for three-factor models. Parsimony suggests that the one-factor model best represents the structure of EF. In light of our results, the implications for the nature of EF in early adolescence in both SEN and Non-SEN groups are discussed.     

The Behaviour of Young Children with Social Communication Disorders During Dyadic Interaction with Peers

Children with social communication disorders are known to experience more problematic peer relations than typically-developing children. However, detailed observation of their behaviour and communication during interaction with peers has not previously been undertaken. Micro-analytic observational methods were used to analyse the audio-taped interaction of children (N?=?112) selected from mainstream schools (ages 5–6 years-old) on a computerised dyadic collaborative task. Comparisons were made between children with average-to-high- and low-pragmatic language skill as measured by the Test of Pragmatic Skills. Dyads were composed of an average-to-high-skilled child plus a low-skilled child (32 dyads), or of two average-to-high-skilled children (24 dyads). Consistently with their pragmatic language scores, low-skilled children were more likely to ignore other children’s questions and requests than were average-to-high-skilled children. When average-to-high-skilled children worked with low-skilled children, as opposed to with other average-to-high-skilled children, they showed some sensitivity and adaptation to these children’s difficulties; they used significantly more directives, clarification and provided more information. However, there was a cost in terms of the emotional tone of these interactions; when working with low-skilled children, the average-to-high-skilled children expressed considerably more negative feelings towards their partners than with another average-to-high-skilled child. In conclusion, observation of the interaction of average-to-high- and low-skilled children suggests promise for peer-assisted interventions and specifies which communicative behaviours could be targeted. However, care should be taken to manage the affective climate of these interactions for the benefit of all children involved.     

Prehistoric dangers and contemporary prejudices

We review the logical principles that guide the application of evolutionary ideas to psychological problems, and show how these principles can be used to derive novel, testable hypotheses about contemporary prejudice processes. We summarise two recent lines of research employing this approach. One line of research examines prejudices resulting from perceived vulnerability to physical injury. The other examines prejudices resulting from perceived vulnerability to disease. Results from both lines of research support novel psychological hypotheses identifying variables--pertaining to both personality and to local context--that trigger specific prejudices against specific categories of people. We conclude by discussing more broadly some of the useful conceptual and practical implications of this evolutionary approach to prejudice.     

Production and Identification Repetition Priming in AmnesticMild Cognitive Impairment

ABSTRACT

The experiment reported here examined implicit memory function, as measured through repetition priming, in amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to examine whether impairments exist in this aspect of memory function. Young adults, healthy older controls, Alzheimer's disease patients, and MCI participants were asked to perform two types of implicit memory tests (word stem completion and threshold identification repetition priming tasks), as well as a recognition test for studied items. As expected, young adults performed better than the other participants on the recognition test and the word stem completion task; there was equivalent priming across groups on the word identification task. While both the older control and MCI participants showed lower levels of priming on the word stem completion task relative to the young adults, the magnitude of priming was equivalent for these two groups, and reliably greater than that of the dementia participants. These results suggest that not all aspects of memory function are impaired in MCI relative to healthy aging.     

On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form.     

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar: A Neglected Discussion of Vagueness

In this paper I explore a neglected discussion of vagueness put forward by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Grammar (1932–34). In this work, unlike Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein not only discusses the venerable Sorites paradox but provides a novel conception of vagueness using an analogy with coin tossing and converging intervals. As he sees it, the problematic picture of vagueness arises because we conflate aspects of the functioning of vague concepts with those of non‐vague ones. Thus, while we accept that vague concepts have no sharp cut‐off points (are boundaryless), we nevertheless retain the idea that we can progress towards the penumbra the way we progress towards the cut‐off points of non‐vague concepts. As a potential remedy, Wittgenstein's analogy with coin tossing and converging intervals replaces this picture and provides an understanding of the functioning of vague concepts in which no notion of a progression arises.