The Puzzle of Theodoret's Christology: A Modest Suggestion

This article suggests that the perplexities of Theodoret's Christologycan be understood well if one regards them as stemming not froma doctrinal evolution (as some scholars argue), but rather froma fundamental (but usually unnoticed) inconsistency that ispresent at all times in Theodoret's life. The inconsistencylies between his normal pattern for writing about Christ andthe way he sometimes writes of Christ when he is dealing withthe crucifixion. Theodoret usually sees the personal subjectof Christ (the one who acts and to whom the human experienceshappen) as the Logos himself, but at times when he discussesthe death of Christ, his strong view of divine impassibilityleads him to see the personal subject who undergoes sufferingand death as the man Jesus. The article substantiates its caseby reviewing the most significant twentieth-century scholarlyliterature on Theodoret and by examining his christologicalwritings from three different periods of his career: the yearsaround the Council of Ephesus (431–3), the year he wrotethe Eranistes (probably 447), and the years immediately priorto the Council of Chalcedon (448–51).     

Injustice in the Spaces between Concepts

I argue that epistemic injustice manifests not only in the content of our concepts, but in the spaces between them. Others have shown that epistemic injustice arises in the form of “testimonial injustice,” where an agent is harmed because her credibility is undervalued, and “hermeneutical injustice,” where an agent is harmed because some community lacks the conceptual resources that would allow her to render her experience intelligible. I think that epistemic injustice also arises as a result of prejudiced and harmful defects in the inferential architecture of both scientific practice and everyday thinking. Drawing on lessons from the philosophy of science, I argue that the inferential architecture of our epistemic practices can be prejudiced and wrongful, leading to a variety of epistemic injustice that I am calling “inferential injustice.” This type of injustice is fully structural; it inheres in our epistemic practices themselves rather than as a direct result of an individual's action. For this reason, cases of inferential injustice are importantly different from extant cases of epistemic injustice and are especially hard to track. We need a better understanding of inferential injustice so that we can avoid and ameliorate cases such as the ones I present here.     

Alcohol and group formation: a multimodal investigation of the effects of alcohol on emotion and social bonding

We integrated research on emotion and on small groups to address a fundamental and enduring question facing alcohol researchers: What are the specific mechanisms that underlie the reinforcing effects of drinking? In one of the largest alcohol-administration studies yet conducted, we employed a novel group-formation paradigm to evaluate the socioemotional effects of alcohol. Seven hundred twenty social drinkers (360 male, 360 female) were assembled into groups of 3 unacquainted persons each and given a moderate dose of an alcoholic, placebo, or control beverage, which they consumed over 36 min. These groups' social interactions were video recorded, and the duration and sequence of interaction partners' facial and speech behaviors were systematically coded (e.g., using the Facial Action Coding System). Alcohol consumption enhanced individual- and group-level behaviors associated with positive affect, reduced individual-level behaviors associated with negative affect, and elevated self-reported bonding. Our results indicate that alcohol facilitates bonding during group formation. Assessing nonverbal responses in social contexts offers new directions for evaluating the effects of alcohol.     

The cinematic gaze as desire for metaphsical comfort

The Journal of Value Inquiry -