Simultaneous effects and aftereffects of the intensity and success aspect in coping with stresses

Intensity and success of coping processes in achievement-related situations are very often tightly connected. Therefore, the specific empirical status of each of the two aspects is unclear. In the current study a technique is introduced which allows orthogonal variation of both components. 64 subjects were confronted with a simple perceptual-speed task in which objective success rate was held constant by a computer-based adaptive process. Graphic feedback was provided about the objective success rate in relation to one of two different success criteria. For half of the subjects the criterion was above (failure condition) and for the other half it was below (success condition) the adaptively controlled success rate. Intensity, the second between-subjects factor, was manipulated by presenting either a high or a low number of items per time unit. As an additional quasi-experimental factor, the degree of action- vs. state-orientation (Kuhl, 1983) was included. The results showed highly specific effects for both the intensity and the failure/success dimension: High intensity resulted in an increase of electrodermal activity which could be observed throughout a one hour post-stressor phase. The failure/success variation had effects mainly on subjective variables representing appraisal of controllability and produced no after-effects. Especially strong effects on subjective variables could be observed when state-oriented subjects were confronted with both failure and high intensity.     

The fast and the slow of skilled bimanual rhythm production: parallel versus integrated timing

Professional pianists performed 2 bimanual rhythms at a wide range of different tempos. The polyrhythmic task required the combination of 2 isochronous sequences (3 against 4) between the hands; in the syncopated rhythm task successive keystrokes formed intervals of identical (isochronous) durations. At slower tempos, pianists relied on integrated timing control merging successive intervals between the hands into a common reference frame. A timer-motor model is proposed based on the concepts of rate fluctuation and the distinction between target specification and timekeeper execution processes as a quantitative account of performance at slow tempos. At rapid rates expert pianists used hand-independent, parallel timing control. In alternative to a model based on a single central clock, findings support a model of flexible control structures with multiple timekeepers that can work in parallel to accommodate specific task constraints.     

On the role of verbalization during task set selection: Switching or serial order control?

Recent task-switching work in which paper-and-pencil administered single-task lists were compared with task-alternation lists has demonstrated large increases in task-switch costs with concurrent articulatory suppression (AS), implicating a crucial role for verbalization during switching (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003). Experiment 1 replicated this result, using computerized assessment, albeit with much smaller effect sizes than in the original reports. In Experiment 2, AS interference was reduced when a sequential cue (spatial location) that indicated the current position in the sequence of task alternations was given. Finally, in Experiment 3, switch trials and no-switch trials were compared within a block of alternating runs of two tasks. Again, AS interference was obtained mainly when the endogenous sequencing demand was high, and it was comparable for no-switch and switch trials. These results suggest that verbalization may be critical for endogenous maintenance and updating of a sequential plan, rather than exclusively for the actual switching process.     

Conflict, consciousness, and control

To what degree is executive conflict resolution dependent on conflict awareness? A recent study by Dehaene et al. compared neural responses to conflict elicited through either visible or subliminal primes. Despite behavioral conflict effects for both prime types, neural activity in a control network including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was present only for visible primes. Along with other recent results, these findings have important implications for theories on the relationship between ACC, consciousness, and cognitive control.     

The cognitive and neural architecture of sequence representation

The authors theorize that 2 neurocognitive sequence-learning systems can be distinguished in serial reaction time experiments, one dorsal (parietal and supplementary motor cortex) and the other ventral (temporal and lateral prefrontal cortex). Dorsal system learning is implicit and associates noncategorized stimuli within dimensional modules. Ventral system learning can be implicit or explicit It also allows associating events across dimensions and therefore is the basis of cross-task integration or interference, depending on degree of cross-task correlation of signals. Accordingly, lack of correlation rather than limited capacity is responsible for dual-task effects on learning. The theory is relevant to issues of attentional effects on learning; the representational basis of complex, sequential skills; hippocampal-versus basal ganglia-based learning; procedural versus declarative memory; and implicit versus explicit memory.     

Differential effects of cue changes and task changes on task-set selection costs

A task-switching paradigm with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks was used to separate cue-switching processes (indexed through pure cue-switch costs) from actual task-switching processes (indexed through additional costs in case of cue and task changes). A large portion of total switch costs was due to cue changes (Experiments 1 and 2), and cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs were sensitive to effects of practice (Experiment 1) and preparation (Experiment 2). In contrast, task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) and task-set inhibition (Experiment 3). Results suggest two processing stages relevant during task-set selection: cue-driven retrieval of task rules from long-term memory and the automatic application of rules to a particular stimulus situation.     

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.     

On how to be unpredictable: evidence from the voluntary task-switching paradigm

The voluntary task-switching paradigm requires subjects to select randomly between tasks and promises to provide a window into executive task selection independent of exogenous influences present in standard task-switching situations. We show here that the degree to which subjects perseverate on tasks across trials captures unique individual differences variance, but also that the switch rate is under strong stimulus-driven control: "Voluntary" switches are much more frequent when the stimulus changes than when it repeats. Most important, we show that individuals whose no-switch trials are selectively slowed exhibit less perseveration and stimulus-driven effects (and thus more voluntary selection) than individuals whose no-switch trials do not show this slowing. We suggest that selective slowing indicates a strategy of treating trials as discrete events--possibly through inhibition of the preceding task set. These results not only demonstrate massive nonvoluntary influences on voluntary selection that are largely untapped by standard task-switching measures, but also show how such influences can be counteracted through strategic adaptations.