Kant and Hegel on purposive action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.     

A positive effect of iron supplementation on the IQS of iron deficient children

To examine possible effects of iron supplementation on the intelligence of young adolescents, iron supplements and placebos were given daily for 16 weeks to two matched groups of 208 and 205 12–15-year-olds. Iron status before the trial began was assessed by the measurement of serum ferritin and haemoglobin levels. In the sample considered as a whole, the iron supplementation had a small but nonsignificant effect on IQ, but those who were iron deficient, with serum ferritin levels of 12 ng/ml and below, showed a statistically significant IQ gain of 5.8 IQ points, as compared with a matched control group given placebos.     

The Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Objection

In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, (1) that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and (2) that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know.     

Somatovisceral interactions in visceral perception: Abdominal masking of colonic stimuli

Clinical and experimental evidence on referred pain and spinal-afferent convergence demonstrates a close relationship between visceral and somatosensory perception, which is important for current models of symptom perception and central body representation. The study uses a psychophysical approach to quantify these interactions at the perceptual level, taking into account problems of comparable intermodal scaling and the role of awareness. An experiment on somatosensory masking of distension stimuli in the colon is reported in which a multiple staircase method of forced choice discrimination with concurrent sensation ratings was employed. Results showed perceptual masking of visceral by abdominal stimuli but not vice versa. The masking effect was not enhanced by intratomal placement of the abdominal stimulus in the lower left quadrant. This contradicts the spinal sensory convergence model and points to perceptual interactions at higher brain levels. Loglinear analysis of relations between discrimination and subjective sensation revealed qualitative differences of somatovisceral perception at the preconscious as compared to the conscious level. This argues for a two-process model of integrative body perception.     

A Process Analysis of “Transient” Therapy Groups

Abstract

This article discusses numerous ethical issues regarding the keeping of records in group psychotherapy, those activities that have to do with the creating, retaining, storing, releasing, and disposing of them. A central dilemma for the group therapist is whether to keep records separately for each individual group member or to keep one record for the group as a whole. Confidentiality of records, patient access, and release of information tend to be more complex issues for group psychotherapists than for individual psychotherapists. Although notes written about the entire group may capture important themes, such notes can compromise the privacy and confidentiality of individual group members. An individual record for each patient is recommended.     

Loke on the Infinite God Objection

In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef’s exposition and response to the so-called ‘Infinite God Objection’ to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God’s knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef’s solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke and show that his objections are unsuccessful.     

Adaptive abilities

Abilities, in contrast to mere dispositions, propensities, or tendencies, abilities seem to be features of agents that put the agent herself in control. But what is the distinguishing feature of abilities vis-à-vis other kinds of powers? Our aim in this paper is to point, in answer to this question, to a crucial feature of abilities that existing accounts have tended to neglect: their adaptivity. Adaptivity is a feature of how abilities are exercised. The main reason for its relative neglect has been that most extant accounts have focused solely on whether abilities are exercised successfully in certain possible situations and have mostly understood the exercise of an ability in terms of complete successful performance. We begin by pointing out two aspects of abilities with regard to which current accounts seem (at best) incomplete: control and exercise. We then introduce adaptivity as we understand it, and end by putting it to work in developing a fuller understanding of abilities that does better than current accounts.     

Colonic sensitivity in irritable bowel syndrome and normal subjects according to their hemispheric preference and cognitive style.

According to our earlier results, non-painful, weak afferent visceral signals may exert a steady influence on brain processes, including cognitive functions. In the present series colonic impulses of irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) subjects served as a model of chronic impact from the gut. Hemispheric preference, as well as cognitive style of information processing served as indicators of covert changes in brain functions. In twenty-one IBS patients and in ten control subjects of both sexes, the thresholds of minimal colonic distension sensitivity has been measured following the determination of hemispheric preference and of advantage in verbal or spatial information processing of the subjects. In IBS patients distension thresholds proved to be higher in verbals than in spatials, whereas in healthy controls the relationship of colonic thresholds and verbal versus spatial advantage was reversed. Among the normal controls with left hemisphere preference a significantly higher distension threshold has been observed than in those with right hemisphere preference, whereas in the IBS group such threshold-differences were not observable.     

Colonic sensitivity in irritable bowel syndrome and normal subjects according to their hemispheric preference and cognitive style

According to our earlier results, non-painful, weak afferent visceral signals may exert a steady influence on brain processes, including cognitive functions. In the present series colonic impulses of irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) subjects served as a model of chronic impact from the gut. Hemispheric preference, as well as cognitive style of information processing served as indicators of covert changes in brain functions. In twentyone IBS patients and in ten control subjects of both sexes, the thresholds of minimal colonic distension sensitivity has been measured following the determination of hemispheric preference and of advantage in verbal or spatial information processing of the subjects. In IBS patients distension thresholds proved to be higher in verbals than in spatials, whereas in healthy controls the relationship of colonic thresholds and verbal versus, spatial advantage was reversed. Among the normal controls with left hemisphere preference a significantly higher distension threshold has been observed than in those with right hemisphere preference, whereas in the IBS group such threshold-differences were not observable.     

Alternative possibilities and asymmetry

It has often been noted that many of our intuitive assessments of particular actions suggest that there is an asymmetry between blameworthy and praiseworthy actions with regard to the question of whether moral responsibility requires that the agent could have acted otherwise. It is a quite different question, though, whether such an asymmetry between good and bad cases can be supported by more systematic considerations. In this paper, I will develop a new argument for a restricted version of the asymmetry, by showing that in cases of praiseworthy actions responsibility cannot generally presuppose that the agent could have acted otherwise. This argument will be based on a distinction between two different kinds of roles that moral norms can play in determining whether an action is right and in guiding our deliberation. That agents can sometimes be responsible for their praiseworthy actions even though they cannot act otherwise is best seen as a reflection of the fact that moral norms can prohibit treating certain courses of action as genuine options at all.