Rousseau on Armour-Propre: T. O'Hagan

This paper was not available at the time of going to press. It will be published in a future volume of the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society.     

Modesty as an excellence in moral perspective taking

I argue for an egalitarian conception of modesty. Modesty is a virtue because an apt expression of what is, and is not, morally salient in our attitudes toward persons and is important because we are prone to arrogance, self‐importance, and hero worship. To make my case, I consider 3 claims which have shaped recent discussions: first, that modesty is valuable because it obviates destructive social rankings; second, that modesty essentially involves an indifference to how others evaluate one's accomplishments; and third, the widespread but normatively fraught assumption that the modest person is deserving of credit. Although the first 2 features identify something significant about modesty, they fail to ground it. I argue that appeals to deserved credit bear a larger explanatory burden than has been supposed; they can smuggle in the illegitimate social hierarchies that modesty is supposed to counter. I make my case for modesty as an excellence in moral perspective by arguing that prominent, nonegalitarian, accounts of modesty allow for or promote illegitimate forms of social privilege. Modesty is valuable because it expresses a commitment to fair distribution of basic moral recognition and a skillful response to unjust social hierarchies at odds with this fair distribution.     

GENDER-RELATED DISCOURSES AS MEDIATORS IN THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INTERNALIZATION OF THE THIN-BODY IDEAL AND INDICANTS OF BODY DISSATISFACTION AND DISORDERED EATING

This study examined whether the gender-related discourses of self-objectification, self-silencing, and anger suppression mediated the association between internalization of the thin-body ideal and body dissatisfaction and eating pathology. We employed a cross-sectional design to study both university ( n  = 140) and community ( n  = 76) samples of women from Ireland ranging from 17 to 30 years of age ( M  = 21.48,  SD  = 3.05). Structural equation modeling was used to test for mediation, with the final model suggesting that gender-related discourses (silencing the self/anger suppression and body surveillance) mediated the association between thin-body ideal internalization and attitudes and behaviors characteristic of disordered eating. Limitations of the current study and directions for future research are highlighted.     

Measuring Stigma Toward Mental Illness: Development and Application of the Mental Illness Stigma Scale1

Guided by theory on stigma, a Likert‐type scale was developed to measure 7 factors of attitudes toward people with mental illness: interpersonal anxiety, relationship disruption, poor hygiene, visibility, treatability, professional efficacy, and recovery. The scale was validated among college students and community members, measuring attitudes toward people with mental illness, depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. In a second application, college students completed the scale from their own perspective, then from an imagined perspective of someone with mental illness, while psychiatric patients completed the scale from their own perspective, then from an imagined viewpoint of someone without mental illness. Psychiatric patients assumed that they were stigmatized to a greater extent than was admitted by the student sample.     

SELF‐KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL STUPIDITY

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self‐knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self‐knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self‐refinement and self‐regulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self‐knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.     

Self-Unity,Identification and Self-Recognition

Philosophia - The concept of identification is often appealed to in explanations of how it is that some actions are authored by an agent, and so autonomous, or free. Over the last several decades,...     

Refractory semantics in global aphasia: On semantic organisation and the Access–Storage distinction in neuropsychology

Abstract

A single case study is reported of a global aphasic patient, JM, with impaired access to semantic information which was particularly severe for the class of proper names. JM's ability to perform matching tasks with printed words and pictures to auditory words deteriorated when items were repeated, especially when the response–stimulus interval was short. Performance was also inconsistent across items. The effect of repeated testing on items generalised to other, previously untested members of the same category. Despite this, JM was able to access general semantic information about stimuli from the affected categories (e.g. to categorise boys' and girls' names), and showed good ability to access an input lexicon concerning these stimuli. There was also a close relationship between the categories affected when he was tested with pictures and printed words. We propose that JM's deficit can be attributed to his semantic system entering an abnormal refractory state once semantic access for a particular item has been achieved, and with this stage being isolated from the procedures providing access to stored lexical knowledge. Furthermore, the representations affected seem common to pictures and printed words. We discuss the implications of the results for understanding the nature of semantic representations in general and for proper names in particular, and for the distinction between access and storage deficits in neuropsychology.     

Contrasting effects of repetition across tasks: Implications for understanding the nature of refractory behavior and models of semantic memory

We describe a patient (J.M.) who showed “refractory” behavior in picture—word matching tasks—that is, his performance became poorer when items were repeated. This contrasts with the facilitatory effects of repetition usually observed in normal participants. We show for the first time that there can be facilitatory effects of repetition on some tasks, even though refractory behavior is shown on the same items in other tasks. In particular, in Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate that J.M. showed contrasting effects of repetition across different components of the language system: There were facilitatory effects of repetition priming on lexical decision but refractory behavior on picture—word matching. In Experiments 3 and 4, we demonstrate that J.M. showed contrasting effects of repetition within the same system (semantic memory). His performance became refractory when items were repeated in picture—word matching (Experiment 3), but it was facilitated when items were repeated in superordinate categorization (Experiment 4). These contrasting patterns of facilitation and interference from repetition priming have implications for understanding the nature of refractory behavior and for constraining theoretical accounts of semantic memory.     

Family crisis intervention in social services

This article advocates the use of family therapy in crisis intervention. It relies upon the literature on crisis intervention, on family therapy literature, and on ten years experience of working in a social services area office, in which social workers are often required to respond alone to many different kinds of crises. Two typical referrals demanding crisis intervention and the responses to them are described.