GENDER AS A MODERATOR OF THE RELATION BETWEEN RACE-RELATED STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH SYMPTOMS FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS

The present study tested gender as a moderator of the relationship between race-related stress and mental health symptoms among African American adults. Because African American women are exposed to stressors associated with race and gender, we hypothesized that African American women would have higher levels of race-related stress and more severe mental health outcomes related to experiences of race-related stress compared to African American men. Multivariate analyses revealed that African American men had higher stress appraisals for institutional racism than did women. No significant gender differences were found for cultural and individual racism. Moderated regression analyses revealed that increases in stress appraisals for individual racism were associated with increases in anxiety and obsessive-compulsive symptoms for African American women. Race-related stress had no significant effects on mental health symptoms for African American men. The findings suggest that gender is an important factor in determining the impact of race-related stress on mental health.     

NAGEL VS. NAGEL ON THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS

In a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind‐body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or ‘transparent’. Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task. In this paper I argue that the Nagel‐Hill‐McLaughlin proposal is preferable – and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself.     

Ordinary Objects and Series‐Style Answers to the Special Composition Question

The special composition question asks, roughly, under what conditions composition occurs. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only ‘ordinary objects’ exist. Peter van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. The common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a ‘series‐style answer’ to the special composition question, but van Inwagen argues that series‐style answers are impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood. In what follows I answer this objection in addition to other, less troubling objections raised by van Inwagen.