THE DISJUNCTION EFFECT IN CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Abstract —One of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty IS Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x IS preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred We present examples in which the decision maker has good reasons for accepting x if A occurs, and different reasons for accepting X if A does not occur Not knowing whether or not A occurs, however, the decision maker may lack a clear reason for accepting X and may opt for another option We suggest that, in the presence of uncertainty, people are often reluctant to think through the implications of each outcome and, as a result, may violate STP This interpretation is supported by the observation that STP is satisfied when people are made aware of their preferences given each outcome     

Extracting the coherent core of human probability judgement: a research program for cognitive psychology

Human intuition is a rich and useful guide to uncertain events in the environment but suffers from probabilistic incoherence in the technical sense. Developing methods for extracting a coherent body of judgement that is maximally consistent with a person's intuition is a challenging task for cognitive psychology, and also relevant to the construction of artificial expert systems. The present article motivates this problem, and outlines one approach to it.     

Remembering chosen and assigned options

Recent studies have shown systematic choice-supportive memory for past choices, wherein people tend to overattribute positive features to options they chose and negative features to unchosen options (Mather & Johnson, 2000, Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000). In contrast, the present experiments showed no choice-supportive memory bias for assigned options. Rather than having a general motivation to recall the chosen or the assigned option in a more positive light, people appear to be influenced by heuristics that vary with context: In recalling past choices, people expect the chosen option to contain more positive and fewer negative features than do its competitors. In recalling past assignments, in contrast, people expect the assigned option to be remembered better than the unassigned alternatives. This vividness heuristic leads to systematic misattribution of new features to unassigned alternatives, but not in a manner supportive of the assigned option. Some implications of these findings are discussed.     

Religious and national radicalism in Middle-Eastern countries: A psychoanalytical point of view

Abstract

This article explores the Adlerian concept of inferiority complexes that serve as a possible source of unconscious motivation for religious and national radicalism. The Middle-Eastern countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey serve as examples. Religious extremism and national radicalism are described as a result of the overcompensation of underlying inferiority complexes caused by belonging to ethnic and religious minorities.     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why some are perceived as more confident and more insecure, more reckless and more cautious, more trusting and more suspicious, than others: Enriched and impoverished options in social judgment

In line with the principle of compatibility, when making social judgments, people tend to focus on personality attributes compatible with the trait under consideration. Better known, orenriched, personages are more likely to present attributes that are compatible with a particular trait than are personages about whom little is known. As a result, enriched personages are more likely to have various, sometimes even conflicting, traits attributed to them. This hypothesis is supported by a number of studies that compare the frequency with which some people are chosen as being better described by opposite trait adjectives than are others. Celebrities more often have both of a pair of opposing adjectives ascribed to them than do less well known figures. Similarly, subjects judge themselves to be better described by either of a pair of opposite adjectives than is a person who is relatively unknown in their lives. The implications for social judgment and for everyday decisions are discussed.     

Can Culture Justify Infant Circumcision?

The paper addresses arguments in the recent philosophical and bioethical literature claiming that social and cultural benefits can justify non-therapeutic male infant circumcision. It rejects these claims by referring to the open future argument, according to which infant circumcision is morally unjustifiable because it violates the child’s right to an open future. The paper also addresses an important objection to the open future argument and examines the strength of the objection to refute the application of the argument to the circumcision case.     

Are liberal perfectionism and neutrality mutually exclusive?

In this paper, I question the view that liberal perfectionism and neutrality are mutually exclusive doctrines. I do so by criticizing two claims made by Jonathan Quong. First, I object to his claim that comprehensive anti-perfectionism is incoherent. Second, I criticize his claim that liberal perfectionism cannot avoid a paternalist stance. I argue that Quong’s substantive assumptions about personal autonomy undermine both of his arguments. I use the discussion of Quong to argue that the standard assumption in liberal theory about mutual exclusivity of liberal perfectionism and neutrality needs to be reconsidered, and I show why the argument about the convergence of perfectionism and neutrality makes conceptual sense.