Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

The Jerusalem TeleRehabilitation System, a new low-cost, haptic rehabilitation approach.

Survivors of brain injury or stroke can improve movement ability with intensive, supervised practice. Since the hours of supervised therapy with a physical or occupational therapist are limited, telerehabilitation will enable patients to greatly expand the hours that they practice therapeutic exercises. The Jerusalem TeleRehabilitation System (JTRS) consists of patient and therapist systems plus a central server and database connected via the internet. The system can work in two modes: (1) a cooperative mode in which the therapist and patient are online at the same time, and (2) a stand-alone mode in which the patient uses the system on his own. In both cases, the system will monitor the status and progress of the patient and various parameters of his movement abilities, and prepare reports for the patient and for the therapist. From the clinic, the therapist will be able to change the screen seen by the patient and change the level and types of tasks, as needed. Compared to existing systems, our system will have the following advantages: (1) inexpensive and easy to use; (2) remote monitoring and control of the patient's computer by the therapist in the clinic; (3) more detailed analysis of patient status and progress; (4) a "smart" system which self-adapts to the patient's capabilities in real time, increasing or decreasing the difficulty of the exercise as needed; and (5) a central, international database which, by gathering data on many patients over time, will provide the basis for "smart" therapy and will also facilitate coordinated multicenter research studies.     

Defining stuttering for research purposes

This is a response to a Letter to the Editor entitled “Stuttering prevalence, incidence and recovery rates depend on how we define it: Comment on Yairi & Ambrose’ article Epidemiology of Stuttering: 21st Century advances” by Paul Brocklehurst (2013). The criticism was directed specifically toward Yairi and Ambrose’ conclusions, based on review of recent studies, regarding the incidence and prevalence of stuttering. In this response, Brocklehurst's arguments and suggestions of criteria for incidence research are discussed and negated.     

An analysis of speech disfluencies in down''s syndrome and in normally intelligent subjects

Spontaneous speech samples were obtained from 19 institutionalized mongoloids and from 19 normally intelligent individuals. All subjects were evaluated by a panel of speech pathologists to be nonstutterers. Subjects' speech samples were analyzed to determine (a) frequency of occurance of seven disfluency categories per 100 words spoken, (b) the proportion of each category in the total number of disfluencies. Statistically significant differences indicated that the mongoloids were more disfluent both absolutely and relatively, on categories that have been regarded as most typical to speech of stutterers. Interpretations were made to reflect on factors which may enhance the high prevalence of stuttering among Down's Syndrome patients.     

Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Interacts with Ambiguity During Sentence Comprehension

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - Conventional opinion about using Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) for examining sentence comprehension maintains that RSVP taxes working memory (WM),...     

What children infer from social categories

Children hold the belief that social categories have essences. We investigated what kinds of properties children feel licensed to infer about a person based on social category membership. Seventy-two 4-6-year-olds were introduced to novel social categories defined as having one internal - psychological or biological - and one external - behavioral or physical - property. For half of the participants, the internal property was described as causing the external one; for the others, no causal relationship between properties was mentioned. Children were asked to choose as a novel exemplar of a category one with only the internal or only the external property. Children inferred that exemplars had a psychological property irrespective of causal status, but they inferred the presence of a biological property only when described as causal. Children did not draw systematic inferences regarding either of the two external properties. These findings indicate that children treat psychological and causal properties as central - and perhaps essential - to human kinds.     

Wiping out memories: New support for a mental context change account of directed forgetting

Costs and benefits of directed forgetting are observed when a between-list instruction to forget List 1 impairs List 1 recall while enhancing List 2 recall. These effects are often ascribed to intentional inhibition of List 1. Contrary to this inhibition account, we found that a forget instruction did not produce costs unless an explicit instruction to concentrate on List 2 was used (Experiment 1). Alternatively, costs may be ascribed to a shift in mental context between encoding and retrieval. Consistent with this mental context-change account, an unexpected task (wiping the computer screen and one's hands) produced costs comparable to a forget instruction, as did as a brief chat between lists (Experiment 2). A number-search task between lists produced neither costs nor benefits (Experiment 3), suggesting that mere distraction is insufficient for inducing mental context change. Our findings support the claim that mental context change underlies both intentional and unintentional forgetting.