Causation and Induction1

The connection between views about causation and attempts to justify inductive reasoning is sufficiently close that some philosophers² have taken success at the latter as a litmus test for the truth of the former. I do not agree with this approach. Like Hume, I believe that the nature of causal connections must be understood prior to, and independently of, solutions to the problem of induction. Like Hume, I also hold that the problem of induction cannot be solved if Hume's analysis of causal connections is correct. But unlike Hume, I believe that that analysis is incorrect. However, I shall not attempt to establish this crucial thesis here. I mention it because this paper presupposes it. Hume's difficulty about causation must—and can—be faced head-on. There are phenomenological grounds for affirming that we sometimes directly experience nonlogical, necessary connections between events. I shall only briefly summarize these grounds, which will be argued for in detail elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which a necessitarian theory of causation can bring the problem of induction closer to solution.     

ISSUES AND STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE LENGTH OF SELF-REPORT SCALES

Greater understanding of the complex interrelationships among work-relevant constructs has increased the number of constructs on organizational surveys. Good psychometric practice also dictates the use of multiple items per construct. The net result has been longer surveys. Longer surveys take more time to complete, tend to have more missing data, and have higher refusal rates than short surveys. Arguably, then, techniques for reducing the length of scales while maintaining psychometric quality are worthwhile. Little guidance exists on how to reduce the length of a multi-item scale and we argue that the most common technique, maximizing internal consistency, is problematic and should be avoided. We present a set of item "quality indices" to help conceptualize the competing issues that influence item retention decisions. Statistical analysis of an example case using these indices suggested that there are 3 key aspects of item quality to consider when reducing a scale. We describe strategies that can assist scale developers in using these 3 aspects of item quality when making scale reduction decisions.     

Mental health problems in rural contexts: A broader perspective: Response to Jackson et al. (2007) Mental health problems in rural contexts: What are the barriers to seeking help from professional providers?

The objectives of this article are to expand and comment upon a recent review in Australian Psychologist of the literature in relation to mental health problems in rural contexts by Jackson et al. (2007). In the present article we review recently published qualitative research on the help‐seeking attitudes and experiences of rural Australian adolescents. While we agree on the utility of the Macintyre, Ellaway, and Cummins (2002) conceptual framework based on notions of health and place, we note that this framework specifically emphasises the importance of the collective dimension. We present a broader perspective on health and place than Jackson et al. (2007) by incorporating social geographic research. We argue that rural mental health research has been hampered by a simplistic view of social stigma of mental illness and that a more thorough conceptualisation of the phenomenon is needed. Finally, we make some further recommendations based on a broader perspective of mental health in rural contexts: one that incorporates an in‐depth understanding of the help‐seeking attitudes and experiences of rural adolescents as well as an appreciation of the collective social functioning of rural communities.     

Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines

One of us coined the notion of an “epistemology engine.” The idea is that some particular technology in its workings and use is seen suggestively as a metaphor for the human subject and often for the production of knowledge itself. In this essay, we further develop the conceptand claim that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological commitments, although suggestive, did not lead him to appreciate the epistemological value of materiality. We also take steps towards establishing how an understanding of this topic can provide the basis for reinterpreting the history of phenomenology.