Educating the Political Imaginary

María Pía Lara's two books, La Democracia como proyecto de identidad ética and Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere are described and analyzed. Her contribution to a feminist left‐Habermasian theory of the relationship between the aesthetic dimension and the political imaginary are discussed. Questions and concerns, however, are raised regarding the assumptions of universal pragmatics and Lara's attempt to offer a positive reading of the dependence of the political imaginary on literary acts and genres.     

ARE MENTAL STATE WELFARISM AND OUR CONCERN FOR NON‐EXPERIENTIAL GOALS INCOMPATIBLE?

Abstract:   The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non-experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between "reality-centered desires" and "experience-centered desires". Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality-centered desires and our desire that they be objectively satisfied. My general strategy is, at the level of the value theory, somewhat analogous to the strategy that indirect consequentialism applies at the level of moral obligation theory. To test my argument, I appeal to Nozick's well-known example of the Experience Machine.     

TRAINING TEAM PERFORMANCE-RELATED ASSERTIVENESS

The present paper extends the existing literature on assertiveness in a way that supports industrial training as well as the selection of individuals for team positions. Data are reported from three studies that examined determinants of team performance-related assertiveness. First, data from 149 college students demonstrated that assertiveness consists of multiple dimensions which were not all related to performance in a team decision-making task. Second, data obtained from 225 business students indicated that correlations among self-report measures and peer ratings of the same assertive responses assigned by intact team members varied according to the interpersonal context (i.e., personal, stranger, work related) in which scale items were framed. Third, data from 60 college students suggested that team performance-related assertiveness has a significant skill component. Whereas both attitudinally focused and skill-based training improved attitudes toward team member assertiveness, practice and feedback were essential to producing behavioral effects. Implications for selection and team training are discussed.     

INDIVIDUAL PROCREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless.