A longitudinal study of pain sensitivity and blood pressure in adolescent boys: results from a 5-year follow-up.

A growing literature has observed a significant reduction in pain sensitivity among hypertensive animals and humans. It is uncertain whether a reduced sensitivity to pain can be observed in nonnotensive individuals who go on to develop high blood pressure. Blood pressure (BP) was reassessed in one hundred fifteen 19-year-old boys initially tested at age 14, when they were also presented with a pain stimulus (mechanical finger pressure). Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that information regarding pain tolerance improved prediction of changes in systolic and diastolic blood pressure beyond that afforded by differences in BP at age 14, parental history of hypertension, and body mass index. These analyses suggest that pain sensitivity may be associated with physiological processes involved in the development of sustained high blood pressure.     

From rarity to evaluative extremity: effects of prevalence information on evaluations of positive and negative characteristics

Experiments showed a scarcity principle in evaluative judgments such that the identical characteristic is evaluated more extremely the lower its perceived prevalence. In Study 1, Ss evaluated a fictitious medical condition that was described as either beneficial or detrimental to health and as occurring in either 30% or in one half of 1% of a test population. The condition was evaluated more extremely--as as a more positive health asset or a more negative health liability--in the low-prevalence than in the high-prevalence conditions. Study 2 demonstrated the same effect in self-evaluations and with a different manipulation of perceived prevalence. Ss were told that they actually had the fictitious medical condition, that it was either beneficial or detrimental to their health, and either that they were the only 1 of 5 Ss who had it or that 4 of the 5 did. Low-prevalence Ss exhibited more extreme evaluative, affective, and behavioral reactions to the medical condition than did high-prevalence Ss. The origins and validity of the scarcity principle are discussed, as are its implications for uniqueness theory, reactance theory, and social evaluation theories.     

Spontaneous skepticism: the interplay of motivation and expectation in responses to favorable and unfavorable medical diagnoses

The quantity of processing view of motivated reasoning predicts that individuals are more likely to spontaneously question the validity of unfavorable than favorable feedback even when the objective likelihood of the feedback is equivalent. Participants were videotaped self-administering a bogus medical test revealing either a favorable or an unfavorable result. In Studies 1 and 2, unfavorable result participants required more time to accept the validity of the test result and were more likely to spontaneously recheck its validity than were favorable result participants. However, unfavorable results also were perceived as less expected than were favorable results, even though the information supplied about their objective likelihood was identical. Study 3 showed that participants evaluating another student's results perceived favorable and unfavorable outcomes as equally likely, suggesting that the subjective likelihood of positive and negative feedback is also subject to motivational influence.     

False memories for end-of-life decisions

OBJECTIVE: To examine people's false memories for end-of-life decisions. DESIGN: In Study 1, older adults decided which life-sustaining treatments they would want if they were seriously ill. They made these judgments twice, approximately 12 months apart. At Time 2, older adults and their self-selected surrogate decision makers tried to recall the older adults' Time 1 decisions. In Study 2, younger adults made treatment decisions twice, approximately 4 months apart. At Time 2, younger adults tried to recall their Time 1 decisions. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Percentage of participants who falsely remembered that their original treatment decisions were the same as their current decisions. RESULTS: In Study 1, older adults falsely remembered that 75% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions; surrogates falsely thought that 86% of older adults' decisions were the same. In Study 2, younger adults falsely remembered that 69% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions. CONCLUSION: Age alone cannot account for people's false memories of their end-of-life decisions; we discuss other mechanisms. The results have practical implications for policies that encourage people to make legal documents specifying their end-of-life treatment decisions.     

Common sense epidemiology: self-based judgments from laypersons and physicians

This article reports two studies on a neglected aspect of common sense epidemiology: subjective estimates of the prevalence of symptoms and diseases. Based on social-psychological research on the false-consensus effect, it was hypothesized that subjects who had a history of a condition would estimate its prevalence to be greater than would subjects who did not have a history of that condition. This hypothesis was supported across several different symptoms and diseases. Expertise did not confer protection from the effect. It occurred among 110 college students in Study 1 as well as among 65 practicing physicians in Study 2. In addition, college students who estimated the prevalence of a condition as relatively high rated that condition as less life-threatening than did other students, and students who had a history of a condition rated it as less life-threatening than did their counterparts without such a history. The discussion focuses on (a) explanations of differences in prevalence estimates as a function of personal health history, (b) implications for laypersons' judgments of seriousness, their emotional reactions to illness threats, and their illness behavior, and (c) implications for physicians' diagnostic behavior.     

Mapping the moral domain

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.     

Projection in surrogate decisions about life-sustaining medical treatments.

To honor the wishes of an incapacitated patient, surrogate decision makers must predict the treatment decisions patients would make for themselves if able. Social psychological research, however, suggests that surrogates' own treatment preferences may influence their predictions of others' preferences. In 2 studies (1 involving 60 college student surrogates and a parent, the other involving 361 elderly outpatients and their chosen surrogate decision maker), surrogates predicted whether a close other would want life-sustaining treatment in hypothetical end-of-life scenarios and stated their own treatment preferences in the same scenarios. Surrogate predictions more closely resembled surrogates' own treatment wishes than they did the wishes of the individual they were trying to predict. Although the majority of prediction errors reflected inaccurate use of surrogates' own treatment preferences, projection was also found to result in accurate prediction more often than counterprojective predictions. The rationality and accuracy of projection in surrogate decision making is discussed.