How automatic is “automatic vigilance”? The role of working memory in attentional interference of negative information

Whereas attentional interference of negative information has previously been assumed to be automatic, the present research hypothesised that this effect depends on the availability of working-memory resources. In two experiments, participants judged the gender of angry versus happy faces. Working-memory load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a math task (Study 1) or mental rehearsal of a one- versus 8-digit number (Study 2). The results showed that angry faces interfered more with gender naming than happy faces, but only when working-memory load was low. As such, attentional interference of negative stimulus features can be modulated by top-down attentional control processes.     

Tuning down the hedonic brain: Cognitive load reduces neural responses to high-calorie food pictures in the nucleus accumbens

The present research examined whether cognitive load modulates the neural processing of appetitive, high-calorie food stimuli. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants quickly categorized high-calorie and low-calorie food pictures versus object pictures as edible or inedible while they concurrently performed a digit-span task that varied between low and high cognitive load (memorizing six digits vs. one digit). In line with predictions, the digit-span task engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) when cognitive load was high compared to low. Moreover, exposure to high-calorie compared to low-calorie food pictures led to increased activation in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), but only when cognitive load was low and not when it was high. In addition, connectivity analyses showed that load altered the functional coupling between NAcc and right DLPFC during presentation of the high-calorie versus low-calorie food pictures. Together, these findings indicate that loading the cognitive system moderates hedonic brain responses to high-calorie food pictures via interactions between NAcc and DLPFC. Our findings are consistent with the putative cognitive nature of food motivation. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Assessing Relational Learning Deficits in Perspective-Taking in Children With High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder

The Psychological Record - Perspective-taking, or the ability to demonstrate awareness of informational states in oneself and in others, has been of recent interest in behavioral psychology. This...     

Clearing the mind: a working memory model of distraction from negative mood

The present research examined whether and how loading working memory can attenuate negative mood. In three experiments, participants were exposed to neutral, weakly negative, or strongly negative pictures followed by a task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating task presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). Participants in all three experiments reported less negative moods in negative trials with high compared to low working memory demand. Working memory demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These findings suggest that loading working memory prevents mood-congruent processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods.     

Looking into the crystal ball of our emotional lives: emotion regulation and the overestimation of future guilt and shame

In the present study, we examined the impact of emotion regulation on the intensity bias in guilt and shame. Fifty-two undergraduates either forecasted their emotions and emotion regulation following a guilt- and shame-eliciting situation or reported their actual experienced emotions and employed emotion regulation. Results showed a clear intensity bias, that is, forecasters predicted to experience more guilt and shame than experiencers actually experienced. Furthermore, results showed that forecasters predicted to employ less down-regulating emotion regulation (i.e. less acceptance) and more up-regulating emotion regulation (i.e. more rumination) than experiencers actually employed. Moreover, results showed that the intensity differences between forecasted and experienced guilt and shame could be explained (i.e. were mediated) by the differences between forecasted and actually employed emotion regulation (i.e. acceptance and rumination). These findings provide support for the hypothesis that the intensity bias can—at least in part—be explained by the misprediction of future emotion regulation.     

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.