HAWKING ON GOD AND CREATION

Abstract. Although full of talk about God, Stephen Hawking's recent best seller, A Brief History of Time , apparently has little use for the traditional notion of God as cosmic creator. More precisely, Hawking seems to reject the idea that we need appeal, any longer, to the notion of creatio originans (originating creation). The reason is that he has developed, over the last decade, a cosmological model that avoids any beginning to spacetime and the universe, and so eliminates the need for a cosmic beginner. I criticize Hawking's model in this essay, arguing that either it is not intended to be construed realistically or that, if it is, the model is highly implausible.     

HAWKING ON GOD AND PHYSICAL THEORY

Abstract. When queried about his objectives, the celebrated theoretical physicist and cosmologist Stephen Hawking has replied, “My goal is a complete understanding of the universe, why it is as it is and why it exists at all.” In this essay, I comment on what Hawking has to say about the role of God in the understanding he seeks. I draw from his popular writings and pronouncements, since both are peppered with references to God and with statements about what God can and cannot do. In particular, I focus on his most recent collection of essays intended for a general audience. I argue that the theological implications Hawking has drawn from his cosmological models are shallow and that the narrow naturalistic path he has taken is inadequate to the large task he has set for himself.     

Emerging from imaginary time

Recent models in quantum cosmology make use of the concept of imaginary time. These models all conjecture a join between regions of imaginary time and regions of real time. We examine the model of James Hartle and Stephen Hawking to argue that the various no-boundary attempts to interpret the transition from imaginary to real time in a logically consistent and physically significant way all fail. We believe this conclusion also applies to quantum tunneling models, such as that proposed by Alexander Vilenkin. We conclude, therefore, that the notion of emerging from imaginary time is incoherent. A consequence of this conclusion seems to be that the whole class of cosmological models appealing to imaginary time is thereby refuted.We would like to thank Quentin Smith for helpful comments on an carlier version of this eassy. Read Guy gratefully acknowledges support from the M.J. Murdock Charitable Trust.     

Creation, Co-operation, and Causality: A Reply to Gregersen

Niels H. Gregersen seeks to illuminate the nature of continuing divine action in the world and to show that the classical theistic doctrine of continuous creation is consonant with some recent scientific theories of self-productive ("autopoietic") systems. Central to these theories is the concept of co-operation; central to Gregersen's theological appropriation of these theories is also the notion of structuring causality developed by philosopher Fred Dretske. While supportive of Gregersen's overall aims and emphases, we find significant disanalogies between co-operation as a theological construct and as an evolutionary strategy. We also doubt the utility of Dretske's notion for his project.     

MAN OF SCIENCE,MAN OF FAITH: PIERRE DUHEM'S “PHYSIQUE DE CROYANT”

The essay “Physique de croyant” is an important statement of Pierre Duhem's position on the relation between his science and his religion. Duhem trod a difficult path, some might say an impossible one, in Republican France because he was both a physicist and a devout Catholic. In this essay, using “Physique de croyant” as a touchstone, I explore the way in which he tried to reconcile his conflicting allegiances. There are several strands in Duhem's strategy that need to be teased out. First, Duhem sought to defend his science against the charge that it was materialist and atheist. He did this with his claim, usually called the autonomy thesis, that physics and metaphysics are fundamentally different enterprises—that physics, properly conducted, has no metaphysical implications and requires no metaphysical support. This did not deny metaphysics its rightful territory. Second, Duhem used his segregationist position to defend the Roman Catholic Church against the assaults of the positivist scientism then in favor with the Republicans. Third, he also sought to protect his science against fellow Catholics who wanted to use it for polemical purposes. I develop and evaluate these lines of defense.     

Helm and Boltzmann: Energetics at the Lübeck Naturforscherversammlung

The energetics controversy is understood variously as energy vs. atoms, thermodynamics vs. statistical mechanics, phenomenalism vs. realism, equations vs. pictures, and especially Ostwald vs. Boltzmann. It is generally thought that at Lübeck in 1895 Boltzmann and Planck demolished energetics, but while its momentum was slowed, energetics in one or more of the above senses still retained supporters as late as the great physics conference at the St. Louis World’s Fair in 1904. Indeed, after Ostwald himself abandoned it in 1908, Ernst Mach began for the first time to defend it. The main emphasis in this paper, however, is on Georg Helm (1851–1923) who had been invited to Lübeck to be the main speaker on energetics. He had adopted his position earlier than Ostwald and his views avoided many of the errors and oversights in Ostwald’s approach. Indeed, Helm could be called the strongest defender of energetics, even if Ostwald was Boltzmann’s main target. Helm was largely Machist in philosophy at that time and did not reify energy. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.