East Asian child-rearing attitudes: an exploration of cultural, demographic and self-disclosure factors among US immigrants

Child-rearing attitudes among East Asian groups have been emphasized in the developmental psychology literature in the context of their association with academic achievement. Although child-rearing attitudes play an important role in the transmission of cultural values, much of the research on East Asian child-rearing attitudes has ignored cultural variables and has instead focused on authoritarian parenting style. The current study examined the association between three classes of variables-culture (i.e., ethnic identity, self-construal, acculturation), demographics (sex, years in the US, English fluency), and self-disclosure-and traditional child-rearing attitudes (TCRA) among East Asian immigrants in the United States. It was hypothesized that higher levels of TCRA would be associated with higher levels of ethnic identity, interdependent self-construal, separation, and guarded self-disclosure, and fewer years spent in the United States. The participants included 170 East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) immigrants (88 men, 82 women) who were administered a battery of psychometrically established measures. Our hypotheses were largely supported. We found that, while there was no significant sex by ethnicity effect for TCRA, men were significantly more likely than women to endorse TCRA and the Korean group had significantly higher TCRA than the Japanese group. Ethnic identity, interdependent self-construal, separation, years in the US, and guarded self-disclosure were significant independent predictors of TCRA. The findings suggest the need for broadening the content of assessment tools of child-rearing attitudes and measuring associated cultural and noncultural variables among East Asian ethnic groups. Future research on child-rearing attitudes among Asian ethnic groups may benefit from (1) measuring multiple dimensions of TCRA, (2) assessing associated cultural variables directly rather than inferring them in an ad hoc fashion based on observed ethnicity differences, (3) measurement of demography (including sex and years spent in the host country) and (4) examining the potential influence of guarded self-disclosure.     

A call for dialogue: psychotherapists and psychologists specialising in psychotherapy

The development of psychotherapy as an independent discipline in many countries in Europe has stimulated debate within the field of psychology as to what constitutes psychotherapy as a specialism of psychology. The authors, both clinical psychologists who pursued further training in psychotherapy, offer a reflection in this paper on the historical battle between psychiatry and psychology for ‘ownership’ of psychotherapy, describe recent developments in Europe to clarify this specialism within psychology and discuss the distinctive contributions that psychologists offer in developing psychotherapy as a specialism within the discipline. The aim of the paper is to begin a dialogue both within the profession of psychology and outside the profession, with our psychotherapy colleagues, that can develop into an interdisciplinary discourse and a more mutually respectful professional environment.     

Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency

Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it fails to show that no conditions are epistemically transparent. Moreover, this reinstates the argument from the transparency of evidence against factive mentalism.     

Perception and the external world

In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.