Collaborative competence,social capital,and mental health: A cross‐sectional analysis of a community‐based intervention for older adults

Social capital interventions for the mental health of older adults have been inconclusive to date, and have rarely investigated the psychological resources that are important to having social capital. This study focused on the “Neighborhoods in Solidarity” (NS), which are a series of Swiss community‐based interventions that aim to empower older adults to participate in their communities. Our goal was to understand whether the NS were associated with collaborative competence, social capital, and subsequently, symptoms of depression. Cross‐sectional data were collected from 947 individuals aged 55 and over (M_age = 68.66, SD = 9.04) in 10 Swiss neighbourhoods (five with the NS [n = 479] and five control neighbourhoods [n = 468]). Structural equation modelling was used to model the relationship between the NS intervention, collaborative competence, cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital, and symptoms of depression (measured by the CESD‐R‐10). Individual participation in the NS had total and indirect effects on symptoms of depression via collaborative competence and both social capitals. These findings suggest that existing community‐based interventions can be indirectly associated with better mental health outcomes in the ageing population.     

Post-stroke depression: Main phenomenological clusters and their relationships with clinical measures

Objectives: To investigate the principal psychopathological dimensions of post-stroke depression (PSD) through the assessment of the factorial structure of the Post-Stroke Depression Rating Scale (PSDRS). Methods: We enrolled ninety-eight subjects with PSD, who underwent the PSDRS, MMSE and Barthel Index. Information about demographic, clinical, and neuroanatomical factors was collected. Results: The factor analysis extracted three factors accounting for 63.4% of the total variance, and identified as: 1) "Depressive and Anxious Symptoms" (DAS); 2) "Lack of Emotional Control" (LEC); 3) "Reduced Motivation" (RM). On multivariate statistics, DAS severity was predicted by previous history of mood disorders and Barthel Index; LEC severity was predicted by Barthel Index; RM severity was predicted by age. Conclusions: The PSDRS displayed a reliable factor structure that agreed with previous interpretation of PSD. In particular, core depressive symptoms seem to be related to premorbid personality and functional status, whereas apathy/anhedonia may be connected to brain aging.     

Reducing self-control by weakening belief in free will

Believing in free will may arise from a biological need for control. People induced to disbelieve in free will show impulsive and antisocial tendencies, suggesting a reduction of the willingness to exert self-control. We investigated whether undermining free will affects two aspects of self-control: intentional inhibition and perceived self-control. We exposed participants either to anti-free will or to neutral messages. The two groups (no-free will and control) then performed a task that required self-control to inhibit a prepotent response. No-free will participants showed less intentional inhibitions than controls, suggesting a reduction of self-control. We assessed perceived self-control by asking participants whether the response resulted from a deliberate intention or from an impulsive reaction. Perceived self-control was lower in the no-free will group than in control group. Our findings show that undermining free will can degrade self-control and provide insights into how disbelieving in free will leads to antisocial tendencies.     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

Cross-border mobility,European identity and participation among European adolescents and young adults

Abstract

Cross-border mobility is one of the most important factors that are assumed to strengthen young people’s commitment as European citizens. However, the existing empirical evidence does not provide consistent support. In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that cross-border mobility is associated with a stronger European identification, more positive attitudes toward the EU, and with specific visions of the EU, and that these factors, in turn, have a positive effect on engagement at EU level. Data were collected as part of the multinational research project CATCH-EyoU. Analyses were performed controlling for gender, income, country, and migrant status. Results mostly confirmed the hypotheses among both adolescents and young adults, and for both short-term and long-term mobility. EU level participation and EU voting intentions appeared to be influenced by partly different factors. The implications of the findings, both at theoretical level and for the development of international mobility programs, are discussed.     

The perception of (naked only) bodies and faceless heads relies on holistic processing: Evidence from the inversion effect

Faces and bodies are more difficult to perceive when presented inverted than when presented upright (i.e., stimulus inversion effect), an effect that has been attributed to the disruption of holistic processing. The features that can trigger holistic processing in faces and bodies, however, still remain elusive. In this study, using a sequential matching task, we tested whether stimulus inversion affects various categories of visual stimuli: faces, faceless heads, faceless heads in body context, headless bodies naked, whole bodies naked, headless bodies clothed, and whole bodies clothed. Both accuracy and inversion efficiency score results show inversion effects for all categories but for clothed bodies (with and without heads). In addition, the magnitude of the inversion effect for face, naked body, and faceless heads was similar. Our findings demonstrate that the perception of faces, faceless heads, and naked bodies relies on holistic processing. Clothed bodies (with and without heads), on the other side, may trigger clothes-sensitive rather than body-sensitive perceptual mechanisms.     

What kind of kind is intelligence?

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.     

The curious,context‐dependent case of anger: Explaining voting intentions in three different national elections

Collective action is typically studied in social protest contexts and predicted by different motivations (i.e., ingroup identification and efficacy beliefs, and outgroup‐directed anger). Assuming that voting to some extent reflects a form of collective action, we tested whether these three different motivations predicted voting in Dutch, Israeli, and Italian national election contexts. Based on previous meta‐analyses on voting and collective action, we hypothesized that identification with and efficacy beliefs regarding this party would motivate voting across the different elections (i.e., context‐independent effects). As for anger, we predicted more context‐dependent effects, depending on whether the anger is targeting the previous government or at the political system at large. Results were largely in line with predictions, showing the relatively context‐independent motivational power of party identification and efficacy beliefs, and clearly context‐dependent effects for anger. Specifically, we found little support for a similar motivational power of anger targeting previous government policies, but anger targeting politics in general demotivated Dutch and Israeli participants to vote (interpreted as an expression of political cynicism), while curiously motivating Italian participants to vote (interpreted as a desire for system change from “old” to “new” politics). We discuss these findings in the context of voting in national elections, and recommend further integration of the voting and social protest literatures.     

Discernibility by Symmetries

In this paper I introduce a novel strategy to deal with the indiscernibility problem for ante rem structuralism. The ante rem structuralist takes the ontology of mathematics to consist of abstract systems of pure relata. Many of such systems are totally symmetrical, in the sense that all of their elements are relationally indiscernible, so the ante rem structuralist seems committed to positing indiscernible yet distinct relata. If she decides to identify them, she falls into mathematical inconsistency while, accepting their distinctness, she finds herself unable to account for it. I show that the ante rem structuralist has in fact the resources to account for the distinctness of indiscernibles and that these resources come from the very symmetry properties of the mathematical objects that seem to pose problems for her.     

Morphemes in their place: Evidence for position-specific identification of suffixes

Previous research strongly suggests that morphologically complex words are recognized in terms of their constituent morphemes. A question thus arises as to how the recognition system codes for morpheme position within words, given that it needs to distinguish morphological anagrams like overhang and hangover. The present study focused specifically on whether the recognition of suffixes occurs in a position-specific fashion. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that morphologically complex nonwords (gasful ) are rejected more slowly than orthographic controls (gasfil ) but that the same interference effect is not present when the morphemic constituents are reversed ( fulgas vs. filgas). Experiment 3 went further in demonstrating that reversing the morphemes within words (e.g., nesskind) does not yield morpheme interference effects against orthographic controls (e.g., nusskind). These results strongly suggest that suffix identification is position specific, which imposes important constraints on the further development of models of morphological processing.