The probability of war in then-crises problem: Modeling new alternatives to Wright's solution

In hisStudy of War, Q. Wright considered a model for the probability of warP during a period ofn crises, and proposed the equationP=1–(1–p) ⁿ , wherep is the probability of war escalating at each individual crisis. This probability measure was formally derived recently by Cioffi-Revilla (1987), using the general theory of political reliability and an interpretation of the n-crises problem as a branching process. Two new, alternate solutions are presented here, one using D. Bernoulli's St. Petersburg Paradox as an analogue, the other based on the logic of conditional probabilities. Analysis shows that, while Wright's solution is robust with regard to the general overall behavior ofp andn, some significant qualitative and quantitative differences emerge from the alternative solutions. In particular,P converges to 1 only in a special case (Wright's) and not generally.C.C.-R. acknowledges support provided by the Merriam Laboratory for Analytic Political Research, the Research Board of the University of Illinois, and grant SES-84-00877 from the U.S. National Science Foundation.     

Inducing fair trade out of hegemonic trade

This paper provides a model of the transition from hegemonic trade to contemporary (or fair) trade. Hegemonic trade is an instance of the two player game called Bully (Poundstone 1992) and Called Bluff (Snyder and Diesing 1977); contemporary trade is an instance of Prisoner's Dilemma (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991). In this paper, I show that a nation under the thumb of a hegemon, called the conciliatory nation, can induce fair trade. Further, I show that to induce fair trade, the conciliatory nation must not be timied.     

Perception of randomness and predicting uncertain events

Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run minority events, called the long-run contrarian strategy; a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run majority events, called the short-run momentum strategy; and a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run minority events, called the short-run contrarian strategy. When the character of events remains unknown, the most common strategy is the short-run momentum strategy. With the increase of a perceived randomness of the situation, people tend more often to use the short-run contrarian strategy. People differ in their general beliefs about the continuation or reversal of a trend in various natural and social processes. Trend believers, when facing sequences of binary events commonly perceived as random, tend to use momentum strategies, whereas those who believe in the trend's reversal tend to use contrarian strategies.     

Cognitive aspects of chronic depression

Previous research on chronic depression has focused on its link with other mood disorders and Axis II personality disorders. However, there are few data examining whether the cognitive perspective applies to this condition. In this cross-sectional study, 42 outpatients with chronic depression were compared with 27 outpatients with nonchronic major depressive disorder and 24 never psychiatrically ill controls on cognitive variables thought to be related to vulnerability to depression (e.g., dysfunctional attitudes, attributional style, a ruminative response style, and maladaptive core beliefs). Both depressed groups were more elevated than a never-ill comparison group. However, chronically depressed individuals were generally more elevated on measures of cognitive variables than those with major depressive disorders even after controlling for mood state and personality disorder symptoms.     

Social norms and the traditional deterrence game

Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of “when, how, and to what degree” norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37:1–27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, 1994), the paradigmatic model of conflict initiation in International Relations. The deterrence game is modeled here as a sequential decision problem. As such, our analysis is an adaptation of Bicchieri’s game-theoretic formalization of norms to what we will call the norms account of the game. We find that the standard account of the traditional deterrence game is a special case of the norms account of the game. We also show that the adaptation of Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms yields new and interesting claims regarding when, how, and to what degree norms operate as a constraint on risk-related behavior in the traditional deterrence game. Moreover, we discuss how the results of the model provide testable propositions of relevance to the role of norms in international interactions.