Rights Externalism

Rights externalism is the thesis that a subject's status as a rightholder is secured not on account of it having a certain nature, but on account of it being afforded a certain sort of social recognition. I believe that rights externalism has been given short shrift, largely because a certain objection is widely taken to be a compelling reason for rejecting it. This objection goes roughly as follows. Both in theory and in practice we commonly appeal to the fact that subjects possess certain nonconventional rights (independently of whether these rights have been socially recognized) to criticize immoral social practices, arrangements, and institutions. But if being a rightholder is directly determined by whether subjects have been afforded a certain sort of social recognition, then we cannot appeal to the fact that subjects possess certain nonconventional rights for critical purposes in some instances, namely, in those instances where the relevant social recognition has not been extended. Although this objection is taken by some rights internalists to justify favoring rights internalism over rights externalism, I argue that it does not.     

Dependence regulation in newlywed couples: A prospective examination

According to the risk regulation model ( S. L. Murray, J. G. Holmes, & N. L. Collins, 2006 ), people need to trust in their partner's regard before they risk interdependence. This study prospectively examines the association between perceived regard and levels of dependence in newlywed couples over 9 years of marriage. Analyses demonstrate that changes in perceived regard predict levels of dependence, changes in dependence do not predict perceived regard, and alternative explanations cannot account for these effects. Further, changes in perceived regard prospectively predict divorce, and levels of dependence mediate this association. Results are discussed in terms of the dependence regulation component of the risk regulation model.     

Enhancing relationship perceptions by reducing felt inferiority: The role of attachment style

To trust in a romantic partner’s acceptance and love, people need to believe they are just as good a person as their partner (and that their partner shares this perception). Yet, people low in attachment security may have difficulty sustaining these beliefs. Two experiments examined the consequences of reducing felt inferiority to the partner. Participants high in attachment anxiety (Experiment 1) and attachment avoidance (Experiment 2) reported greater confidence in their partner’s acceptance and love and attached greater value to their partner when led to feel (or to believe their partner saw them as) superior to their partner. Thus, reducing felt inferiority may effectively enhance relationship perceptions for people relatively low in attachment security.     

Parasocial relationships and self‐discrepancies: Faux relationships have benefits for low self‐esteem individuals

The current research proposes that low self‐esteem people can use parasocial relationships to experience movement toward the ideal self, a benefit they may miss in real relationships. In Study 1, low self‐esteem undergraduate psychology students at a public university in the United States felt closest to celebrities who were similar to their ideal self. In Study 2, low self‐esteem college students primed with their favorite celebrity became more similar to their ideal selves. In Study 3, low self‐esteem college students primed with their favorite celebrity, but not a close relationship partner, became more similar to their ideal selves. Results are discussed in terms of the implications for parasocial relationships, self‐esteem, and the flexibility of the need to belong.