Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism?

Does a commitment to mereological universalism automatically bring along a commitment to the controversial doctrine of mereological extensionalism—the view that objects with the same proper parts are identical? A recent argument suggests the answer is ‘yes’. This paper attempts a systematic response to the argument, considering nearly every available line of reply. It argues that only one approach—the mutual parts view—can yield a viable mereology where universalism does not entail extensionalism.     

Models for Hylomorphism

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In a series of papers (Fine et al., 1982; Fine, Noûs28(2), 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his...     

Universalism and Junk

Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn [2009 Bohn, Einar D. 2009a. An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition, Analysis 69/1: 27–31.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], which proceeds from (i) the incompatibility of junk with universalism and (ii) the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on (ii); however, recent authors have cast doubt on (i). This paper undertakes a defence of premise (i) against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise (i) from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa [2012 Contessa, Gabriel 2012. The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists, Analysis 72/3: 455–7.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums (which are compatible with junk) rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is due to Spencer [2012 Spencer, Joshua. 2012. All Things Must Pass Away, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 7, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 67–92.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]]. His view is that there is no absolutely unrestricted plural universal quantifier; so any statement of the unrestricted fusion axiom will simply not rule out the existence of junky worlds. I argue that the failure of unrestricted quantification will not be enough by itself to establish the existence of junk. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this view counts as a form of mereological universalism. As a result, I suggest that if one wants to reject the junk argument, premise (ii) is the only viable option.     

Analysis of response allocation in individuals with multiple forms of stereotyped behavior

Three experiments were conducted to evaluate response allocation of stereotypy during free-operant and restricted-operant conditions. Five children with autism or related developmental disabilities participated in at least one and up to three of the experiments. In Experiment 1, the stereotypic response that emerged as most probable during a free-operant phase was restricted, and response allocation was again evaluated. The results for 3 participants showed that restricting the high-probability response was correlated with covarying reductions in a nontargeted stereotypy. In Experiment 2, the effect of environmental enrichment on response allocation was evaluated. One participant reallocated behavior to appropriate object manipulation, 1 participant showed no change in behavior, and a 3rd participant reallocated behavior to object manipulation only when the putative stimulus products of the object manipulation matched those of stereotypy. In Experiment 3, additional interventions were implemented to promote response reallocation. Results showed that both response restriction and reinforcement for object manipulation decreased stereotypy and increased object manipulation. Collectively, the results of these experiments point to a need for complex evaluations of interventions for stereotypy.     

Theism and Dialetheism

The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or to set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell's paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—became a major player in the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled against the divine attributes.