Objectively reliable subjective probabilities

Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, we ought to employ a (joint) probability measure that is inductively successful in that situation, if such a measure exists. In order to do show that the restriction is possible to meet in a broad class of cases, I prove a Bayesian Completeness Theorem, which says that for any solvable inductive problem of a certain broad type, there exist probability measures that a Bayesian could use to solve the problem. I then briefly compare the merits of my proposal with two other well-known proposals for constraining the class of admissible subjective probability measures, the leave the door ajar condition and the maximize entropy condition.The author owes special thanks to Kevin Kelly, for a number of helpful ideas for the proof of the Bayesian Completeness Theorem, as well as other aspects of the paper. Thanks also to Clark Glymour for some helpful suggestions for improvement of an earlier draft. Part of the work leading to this paper was funded by a Summer Research Grant from the University Research Institute of the University of Texas at Austin.     

Statistical Data and Mathematical Propositions

Statistical tests of the primality of some numbers look similar to statistical tests of many nonmathematical, clearly empirical propositions. Yet interpretations of probability prima facie appear to preclude the possibility of statistical tests of mathematical propositions. For example, it is hard to understand how the statement that n is prime could have a frequentist probability other than 0 or 1. On the other hand, subjectivist approaches appear to be saddled with ‘coherence’ constraints on rational probabilities that require rational agents to assign extremal probabilities to logical and mathematical propositions. In the light of these problems, many philosophers have come to think that there must be some way to generalize a Bayesian statistical account. In this article I propose that a classical frequentist approach should be reconsidered. I conclude that we can give a conditional justification of statistical testing of at least some mathematical hypotheses: if statistical tests provide us with reasons to believe or bet on empirical hypotheses in the standard situations, then they also provide us with reasons to believe or bet on mathematical hypotheses in the structurally similar mathematical cases.     

Contents of volume 145

Volume contents

Contents of volume 145     

Representing tools: how two non-human primate species distinguish between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool

Few studies have examined whether non-human tool-users understand the properties that are relevant for a tool's function. We tested cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on an expectancy violation procedure designed to assess whether these species make distinctions between the functionally relevant and irrelevant features of a tool. Subjects watched an experimenter use a tool to push a grape down a ramp, and then were presented with different displays in which the features of the original tool (shape, color, orientation) were selectively varied. Results indicated that both species looked longer when a newly shaped stick acted on the grape than when a newly colored stick performed the same action, suggesting that both species perceive shape as a more salient transformation than color. In contrast, tamarins, but not rhesus, attended to changes in the tool's orientation. We propose that some non-human primates begin with a predisposition to attend to a tool's shape and, with sufficient experience, develop a more sophisticated understanding of the features that are functionally relevant to tools.     

Girls’ Perspectives of Barriers to Outdoor Physical Activity Through Photovoice: A Call for Counselor Advocacy

Physical inactivity and limited time spent in nature are major societal concerns that affect the mental and emotional health of youth in the United States. As such, this study explored girls’ perspectives of barriers to outdoor physical activity using a qualitative participatory action research method called photovoice. Six themes emerged from data representing the girls’ perspectives of barriers to outdoor physical activity through photovoice: Very Busy Schedule, Social Media, Health Concerns, Indoor Activity Instead of Outdoor Activity, Electronic Devices, and Way of Life. Researchers address how counselors can use these findings to advocate on this issue, given that counselors are called to advocate at multiple levels to address barriers that inhibit the growth and development of clients.     

Sex differences in jealousy: the (lack of) influence of researcher theoretical perspective

The sex difference in jealousy is an effect that has generated significant controversy in the academic literature (resulting in two meta-analyses that reached different conclusions on the presence or absence of the effect). In this study, we had a team of researchers from different theoretical perspectives use identical protocols to test whether the sex difference in jealousy would occur across many different samples (while testing whether mate value would moderate the effect). In our samples, we found the sex difference in jealousy to occur using both forced choice and continuous measures, this effect appeared in several different settings, and, we found that mate value moderated participant responses. The results are discussed in light of the controversy surrounding the presence of the effect.