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This Introduction to the special issue on ??Skepticism and Justification?? provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue. 相似文献
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Annalisa Coliva 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):29-39
The paper offers a critical review of Roberto Farneti’s paper “a minor philosophy. The state of the art of philosophical scholarship
in Italy”, recently published in Philosophia. It is argued that overall the status and interest of philosophy as practiced
nowadays in Italy is less disappointing than Farneti makes out. It is also maintained that submitting papers to peer-refereed
international journals can help cure the moral and sociological disease that besets the Italian academia, but that, as such,
it is less likely to improve the scientific quality of contributions in philosophy than Farneti claims. In passing, a few
recommendations both to the philosophical community at large and to the Italian Government are put forward. 相似文献
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Annalisa Coliva 《Synthese》2009,171(3):365-375
In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states. 相似文献
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Annalisa Coliva 《Philosophical Investigations》2010,33(1):1-23
The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.” 相似文献
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Annalisa Coliva 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):101-116
In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called respectively ‘deciding what to believe’ and ‘settling the question’. Depending on which project is in hand, according to Davies, the diagnoses of its failure—if indeed it fails—will differ. I believe that, by introducing the idea that the effectiveness of a valid argument may be epistemic project-relative, Davies has pointed the way to an important reorientation of the debates about Moore's Proof. But I wish to take issue with much of the detail of his proposals. I argue that Davies's characterization of his two projects is misleading (§1), and his account of their distinction defective (§2). I then canvass some suggestions about how it may be improved upon and about how further relevant kinds of epistemic projects in which Moore's argument may be taken to be a move can be characterized, bringing out how each of these projects impinges differently on the issue of the Proof's failure and of its diagnosis (§§3 and 4). In conclusion (§5) I offer an overview of the resulting terrain. 相似文献
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Annalisa Coliva 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(3):233-252
AbstractThe aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why they are defective. 相似文献