The role of effort type and intensity in children's decisions about effort-based outcomes

Despite the importance of persistence in early learning, we know little about how children reason about outcomes that result from their efforts. Here we examined the role of effort type (i.e., physical vs. cognitive) and intensity (i.e., high vs. low effort) in shaping children's decision making about effort-based rewards. Five- to 7-year-olds (N = 133) were assigned to one of four conditions (High Physical Effort, Low Physical Effort, High Cognitive Effort, Low Cognitive Effort) and completed a series of tasks to construct a toy. Tasks varied in the type (physical/cognitive) and intensity (high/low) of effort required to complete them. After constructing their toy, children completed a series of tasks to probe how much they valued that toy. Across conditions, children preferred their toy and gave it a higher monetary value, relative to a stranger's. However, when choosing their toy came at a cost, children no longer preferred it. Only children who built their toy through either cognitive or low effort were willing to incur a cost for their toy. Older children, across conditions, were also more likely to incur a cost for their toy. These findings demonstrate that by age five, children are sensitive to variations in effort type and intensity, and these factors shape how they evaluate effort-based rewards.     

The notion of elements in the visual field in a theory of visual attention: A reply to van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993)

Van der Velde and van der Heijden (1993) criticized the way in which the notion of elements in the visual field is used in my theory of visual attention (Bundesen, 1990) and in my reinterpretation of Nissen’s (1985) findings (Bundesen, 1991). The critique is repudiated here. Idefend the critical assumption that perceptual units (elements in the visual field), formed on the basis ofprecategorica4 sensory information, can be addressed by later processes before any perceptual categorizations have been made. I also point out that, despite the claims of van der Velde and van der Heijden, my reinterpretation of Nissen’s findings is testable.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Very clever homunculus: Compound stimulus strategies for the explicit task-cuing procedure

In two experiments, subjects were given arbitrary letter cues or meaningful word cues that specified the task to be performed on a subsequent target stimulus. Letter and word cues were presented in separate blocks. There were two cues of each type for each task. Three kinds of transitions separated tasks:cue repetitions, in which both the cue and the task repeated;task repetitions, in which the cue changed but the task repeated; andtask alternations, in which both the cue and the task changed. Responses were faster for cue than for task repetitions for both cue types. With word cues, task repetitions were not reliably faster than task alternations. With letter cues, task repetitions were reliably faster than task alternations in the first block but not in the second block. The results suggest that subjects responded to the compound of the cue and the target rather than switching task set between trials.     

A holistic account of the own-race effect in face recognition: evidence from a cross-cultural study

A robust finding in the cross-cultural research is that people's memories for faces of their own race are superior to their memories for other-race faces. However, the mechanisms underlying the own-race effect have not been well defined. In this study, a holistic explanation was examined in which Caucasian and Asian participants were asked to recognize features of Caucasian and Asian faces presented in isolation and in the whole face. The main finding was that Caucasian participants recognized own-race faces more holistically than Asian faces whereas Asian participants demonstrated holistic recognition for both own-race and other-race faces. The differences in holistic recognition between Caucasian and Asian participants mirrored differences in their relative experience with own-race and other-race faces. These results suggest that the own-race effect may arise from the holistic recognition of faces from a highly familiar racial group.     

Depression and cognitive impairment in disability-free early multiple sclerosis

Cognitive and emotional capabilities were evaluated in 73 female patients with stable relapsing-remitting definite, and/or laboratory-supported multiple sclerosis (MS) and were compared with 32 matched healthy controls. Patients were categorized according to their score in the expanded disability status scale (EDSS) to either no (EDSS 0, n = 33) or few clinical signs (EDSS 1-2, n = 40) of MS without physical disability. Patients with EDSS > 0 were characterized by significantly (p < 0.001) higher scores on "von Zerssen's" depression scale, compared to controls. Patients with higher EDSS scores (1-2) showed significantly decreased performance with respect to the total score of Kimura's Recurring-Figures-Test (p < 0.001), in addition. Regarding visuo-constructive functioning, patients with EDSS=0 performed to a significantly lower level (p < 0.001), compared to controls. These results indicate that depression may present as an early sign in MS followed by cognitive impairment, in particular visuo-spatial short-term memory, before physical disability appears. Neuropsychological tests as mentioned here could serve as early diagnostic tools to detect subtle disease progression and to initiate and monitor disease modifying therapies.     

Understanding the mediating role of toxic emotional experiences in the relationship between negative emotions and adverse outcomes

Research has demonstrated that experiencing negative emotions at work can have adverse consequences for individuals and organizations. However, little research has explored why negative emotions can be associated with detrimental effects. To address this gap, the authors argue that it is critical to consider how emotions are experienced. Across two field studies (N= 876 and N= 136), the authors investigate the mediating role of toxic emotional experiences (TEEs) in the relationship between negative emotions and adverse outcomes. The three TEEs dimensions (i.e., psychologically recurring, disconnecting, and draining) are examined as well as the composite score. Results indicated that the TEEs composite mediated the relationship between negative emotions and psychological health, attitudes towards the organization, performance, and helping behaviours. Mixed results were found for the three TEEs dimensions. A number of theoretical implications are explored including the differential roles of negative emotions versus TEEs, the distinct effects associated with each of the TEEs dimensions, and the importance of exploring how emotions are experienced at work. Practical implications related to effectively managing negative emotions and preventing ‘toxic' experiences are also discussed.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.