Promoting social initiation in children with autism using video modeling

A large number of studies have shown that children and youths with autism can improve their social skills when provided with appropriate and well planned treatment strategies. Here, a video modeling procedure was implemented with seven developmentally delayed children, using a multiple‐treatment design. Each child watched a videotape showing a model and the experimenter engaged in a simple social interactive play in an adapted play setting. Afterwards each child's behavior was assessed in this setting, while the experimenter's behavior remained the same as that shown in the videotape. The video modeling training enhanced the social initiation skills of four children. It also facilitated appropriate play engagement, which generalized across settings, peers, and toys. These changes maintained after a 1‐ and 2‐month follow‐up period. The intervention was evaluated as a time‐efficient teaching tool as well as a means of enhancing appropriate play skills. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pollard on Habits of Action

Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of action. These shortcomings are a consequence of certain assumptions Pollard shares with the accounts of mind and action he sets to criticize. As long as these assumptions are left intact, the potential of dispositional notions such as habit and skill to contribute to contemporary debates will not be realized.     

Neurobiological Markers of Illness Onset in Psychosis and Schizophrenia: The Search for a Moving Target

In this review, we describe neuropsychological and brain imaging findings in the early stages of psychosis and schizophrenia. We focus on recent clinical high-risk studies and consider whether the evidence supports these as ‘endophenotypes’ of a vulnerability to the illness or as ‘biomarkers’ of illness onset and transition. The findings suggest that there are a number of processes at psychosis onset that may represent biomarkers of incipient illness. These neurobiological indices particularly implicate the integrity of frontal and temporal cortices, which may or may not be related to the genetics of psychosis (i.e. potential ‘endophenotypes’). However, these brain regions are dynamically changing during normal maturation, meaning that any putative neurobiological markers identified at the earliest stages of illness may be relatively unstable. We suggest that, while such measures may be readily identified as potential neurobiological markers of established illness, they are inconsistent at (or around) the time of illness onset when assessed cross-sectionally. Instead, identification of more valid risk markers may require longitudinal assessment to ascertain normal or abnormal trajectories of neurodevelopment. Accordingly, we assert that the current conceptualisations of potential biomarkers and/or ‘endophenotypes’ for schizophrenia may need to be reconsidered in the context of normal and abnormal brain maturational processes at the time of onset of psychotic disorders.     

Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?

Philosophia - I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to...     

Intuitive control of mobile robots: an architecture for autonomous adaptive dynamic behaviour integration

In this paper, we present a novel approach to human–robot control. Taking inspiration from behaviour-based robotics and self-organisation principles, we present an interfacing mechanism, with the ability to adapt both towards the user and the robotic morphology. The aim is for a transparent mechanism connecting user and robot, allowing for a seamless integration of control signals and robot behaviours. Instead of the user adapting to the interface and control paradigm, the proposed architecture allows the user to shape the control motifs in their way of preference, moving away from the case where the user has to read and understand an operation manual, or it has to learn to operate a specific device. Starting from a tabula rasa basis, the architecture is able to identify control patterns (behaviours) for the given robotic morphology and successfully merge them with control signals from the user, regardless of the input device used. The structural components of the interface are presented and assessed both individually and as a whole. Inherent properties of the architecture are presented and explained. At the same time, emergent properties are presented and investigated. As a whole, this paradigm of control is found to highlight the potential for a change in the paradigm of robotic control, and a new level in the taxonomy of human in the loop systems.     

Expressivism,question substitution and evolutionary debunking

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: (a) raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and (b) supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected.     

Evaluating everyday explanations

People frequently rely on explanations provided by others to understand complex phenomena. A fair amount of attention has been devoted to the study of scientific explanation, and less on understanding how people evaluate naturalistic, everyday explanations. Using a corpus of diverse explanations from Reddit’s “Explain Like I’m Five” and other online sources, we assessed how well a variety of explanatory criteria predict judgments of explanation quality. We find that while some criteria previously identified as explanatory virtues do predict explanation quality in naturalistic settings, other criteria, such as simplicity, do not. Notably, we find that people have a preference for complex explanations that invoke more causal mechanisms to explain an effect. We propose that this preference for complexity is driven by a desire to identify enough causes to make the effect seem inevitable.